Let Taiwan join the United Nations

The 50th anniversary of the United Nations is bringing the issue of Taiwan’s membership to the forefront of the international agenda again. At present, the world body, which was set up to promote universal peace and stability, is leaving an increasingly free, democratic, and independent nation of 21 million people out in the cold.

In this issue of Taiwan Communiqué we argue that the founding principles of the United Nations require that this new Taiwan be embraced as a full and equal member of this world body: Article 1.2 emphasizes that the UN was set up “...based on the respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” It is time for the UN to live up to these principles.

Echo Lin, FAPA

Demonstrating in New York in support of Taiwan membership in the UN
On the following pages we also explain why the attempts by the Kuomintang authorities to enter the UN as the “Republic of China on Taiwan” have failed, and why this approach will remain a dead-end street.

The case for Taiwan membership

It needs to be emphasized that Taiwan fulfills all requirements and conditions of a nation-state: it has a defined territory, a population of 21 million (greater than that of three quarters of the UN member nations), and a government which exercises effective jurisdiction over the territory and the population, and has over the past several years become significantly more democratic.

Why is it important that this de-facto independent country becomes a member of the UN? First, because of the original principles of the UN itself: the world body was founded on the principles of universality and self-determination. If the UN is to survive as an institution that safeguards world peace, it is essential that it adheres to these principles, and apply them to the case of Taiwan.

The demise of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, was primarily due to the fact that the League’s principles were not adhered to: it became a pawn in the chess-game of a few bigger nations, and its effectiveness in protecting the rights of smaller nations was reduced to zero. The invasion of then-Abbessynia (today’s Ethiopia) by Italy was a prime example. We see a disturbing trend in a similar direction in the UN today: its inability to solve the Bosnia crisis.

A second reason for supporting Taiwan’s membership in the UN is that this further internationalizes the debate about its future status, and thus counters the attempts by China to deal with it as an “internal problem.” Achievement of UN-membership will formalize international recognition of Taiwan’s de facto independent status.

A third reason is that over the past decade Taiwan has — due to the hard work of the democratic opposition of the DPP and the overseas Taiwanese community — achieved a democratic political system. This argument is especially relevant for the United States and Europe. It would be highly peculiar, if not indefensible, for the West to deny UN membership to a free and democratic nation, while condoning the presence of repressive, undemocratic nations such as China, Iraq, Iran, etc. This would be a flagrant violation of basic democratic principles.
A fourth reason, which has been emphasized extensively already by the Kuomintang authorities themselves, is that Taiwan — with its human and economic resources — can contribute to the international community in many areas: economic and agricultural assistance, technical assistance, disaster relief etc. Taiwan is a major international player on the economic front. It should be accepted as a full and equal player in all respects.

**Long-term strategy**

Of course the road towards UN-membership is a long-term effort: China does have a seat in the UN Security Council, and it will try to use everything within its power to resist Taiwan’s membership. However, it is a matter of persistence and determination: it took the United States some seven years before it gained international recognition for its independence. It wasn’t until 1783 (seven years after the Declaration of Independence) that the first nation (France) extended diplomatic recognition to the new country — this in spite of strenuous objections of the mightiest power on earth at that time: Great Britain.

The approach which has the highest chance of success is thus based on the four arguments, which were outlined earlier: 1) the UN principles of universality and self-determination, 2) it is an international issue, not an issue “to be determined by the Chinese themselves”, 3) Taiwan has achieved a democratic political system, and 4) Taiwan can contribute to the international community.

**De-linkage and smart diplomacy**

In terms of tactics, the international community should de-link the Taiwan question from their relations with China: relations with Taiwan and its membership in the UN should be considered on its own merits. Taiwan should not be used as a pawn in a larger — geopolitical — chess-game with China. Of course China will continue to insist on a linkage, but if other nations consistently separate the issues, then eventually China will have no choice but to go along.

Another aspect is that the international community should deal firmly with China. All too often, nations cower when China throws its temper tantrums. China should learn to behave like a responsible player in the international community.

Taiwan should conduct “smart diplomacy”, and be on the look-out for those nations which are less susceptible to pressures from China, those nations which generally hold
UN principles high, those nations which have gone through a similar recent history as Taiwan. It should always be on the lookout for new opportunities to gain international support, and e.g. go to the Nordic countries in Europe, and to the newly democratic Eastern European nations, such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

**No old rival, but new neighbor**

It needs to be emphasized strongly that this new Taiwan is totally different from the old “Republic of China” which was kicked out of the United Nations in 1971. As we argued before: Resolution 2758 dealt with the question who was representing China in the United Nations. It did not deal with the question of Taiwan’s representation, which is a separate issue, to be dealt with as a follow up on the decisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951-52 (see "Towards a new Taiwan policy" in *Communiqué* no. 67).

For China, the new Taiwan is thus not the old rival from the days of the Chinese Civil War on the mainland (a myth perpetuated by the Kuomintang authorities for many decades), but a new neighbor, which wants to live in peace with all its neighbors, including the big brother across the Straits.

As was written in a recent eloquent letter by Lord Avebury, the British Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, to China’s ambassador in London:

“If the people of Taiwan decide that they want the international community to recognize their existence as an independent state, and formally apply for UN membership, I hope that the People’s Republic of China will gracefully acquiesce, even if they continue to feel emotionally that Taiwan is part of their state.

The best way they have of persuading Taiwan ultimately to reunify with China is to allow Tibet, Mongolia, East Turkestan and, after July 1997, Hong Kong, to develop their own lines. One has to say that, looking at the first three of the territories mentioned, there is nothing to attract the Taiwanese to throw in their lot with the PRC.”

**Why the "ROC" is rejected**

The three attempts which have been made in 1993, 1994, and 1995 — primarily by Central American nations — to put the question of the “exceptional status of the Republic of China on Taiwan” on the UN agenda have failed. Why? The international community decided a long time ago that it accepts a “One China” policy, meaning that
the government in Peking is generally recognized as representing “China.” This issue was settled in 1971.

The road towards the UN will thus remain a dead-end street for Taiwan as long as the Kuomintang authorities continue to present themselves as “Republic of China”. A two-China approach is thus still-born. Furthermore, the so-called “ROC” is anathema to the Chinese leaders who have gone through the civil war on the mainland, and will remain so to their political heirs in Beijing for decades to come.

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US - China relations inch up again

Mr. Jiang doesn’t come to Washington

During the summer of 1995, China’s unruly behavior on a wide range of issues — from the Spratley’s, missile and nuclear technology exports to respectively Pakistan and Iran, and Taiwan President Lee’s visit to the US — caused a downturn in US-China relations. As we explained in the previous issue of Taiwan Communiqué (no. 67, pp. 8-10), the deeper underlying reason for China’s bullying is the power struggle going on in Beijing in anticipation of the passing of Deng Xiao-ping.

From the end of August through mid-October, President Clinton and the US State Department performed some deft maneuvering, and succeeded in deflating the Chinese hot-air bubble to some extent. Some examples:
1. Mrs. Hillary Clinton did attend the UN Women’s Conference in Beijing, and the parallel NGO-conference in Huairou, but rightly used the occasion to criticize China for its violations of human rights in general, and women’s rights in particular.

2. Mr. Clinton did meet with the Dalai Lama during the Tibetan leader’s visit to Washington, but defused the Chinese criticism by terming the meeting “unofficial.”

3. Mr. Clinton did agree to meet Mr. Jiang Zemin, but rejected Chinese demands that Mr. Jiang would be received in Washington with a full head-of-state welcome, and a 21-gun salute and a parade down Pennsylvania Avenue.

However, at the same time several “old” sore points in US-China relations resurfaced: reports from Washington and Beijing indicated that Chinese piracy of software, recorded music, movies, and books continued rampantly. This in spite of the 26 February 1995 Agreement between the US and China, in which China agreed to clamp down on pirate manufacturers, and to start abiding by international copyright agreements.

Another old issue which resurfaced was Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown’s trip to China in 1994. Mr. Brown’s trip was controversial because Mr. Brown’s kowtowing to Beijing (see our report “Mr. Brown goes to Beijing”, Taiwan Communiqué no. 62, p. 7-8). At that time, Mr. Brown claimed that his visit had resulted in US$ 6 billion worth of contracts for US companies. According to a recent report in the Washington Post (“Brown’s China deals stall”, 13 October 1995) at this time — more than a year later — less than 20% of the projects have gotten off the ground.

No to “Fourth Communiqué”

However, the main issue at present is that the Clinton Administration until now has failed to bring any clarity to its Taiwan policy. On various occasions Secretary of State Christopher and Assistant Secretary Winston Lord are reiterating that the US has “not changed its position”, and that it is not changing its longstanding “One-China” policy.

If this would only mean that the US recognizes Beijing — and not the Kuomintang authorities in Taipei — as the government of China, then few would question this position. However, the position of the Clinton Administration becomes nebulous where it concerns the status of Taiwan.
The US rightly rejected Chinese demands that a “Fourth Communiqué” be issued, in which the US would express agreement with the Chinese claims to sovereignty over Taiwan.

Taiwan Communiqué comment: If the US should issue any “Communiqué” on the status of Taiwan, it should consult with the leaders of a democratically-elected government of Taiwan. In this “Taiwan Communiqué” (no link intended with the name of our publication) the U.S. and Taiwan should reaffirm clearly that:

1. It is the right of the Taiwanese people to determine their own future, free from coercion by China;

2. The US supports Taiwan's right to be a full member of the international family of nations, including the United Nations, and

3. Any threat to the safety and security of Taiwan is of grave concern to the US — as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

Taiwanese-Americans write Mr. Clinton

In the face of the upcoming meeting between President Clinton and Mr. Jiang Zemin, the Taiwanese-American community expressed its deep concerns, in particular that the improvement of the relations between the US and China would not be at the expense of the people of Taiwan or the future of the island. Below is the text of a letter written jointly by several major Taiwanese American organizations:
President William J. Clinton  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20500  
September 26th, 1995

Dear Mr. President:

We understand that you are preparing to meet China’s President Jiang Zemin on the occasion of the upcoming 50th Anniversary meeting of the UN in New York. While we agree with you that the relations between the United States and China can be improved, we feel strongly that this should not be done at the expense of the 21 million people of Taiwan or their future as a free, democratic and independent member of the world community.

The international position of Taiwan hangs in limbo, firstly because of the short-sighted policies of the Kuomintang authorities themselves, who for far too long claimed to be the legitimate rulers of all of China. The native Taiwanese (85% of the population of the island) had nothing to do with the Chinese Civil War on the mainland, but from the 1940s on became unwilling victims when the Kuomintang moved to the island and established its repressive regime.

However, over the past decade a political transformation has occurred on the island, which makes it a different country altogether. We Taiwanese have our own identity, language and culture, and our families and friends on the island worked hard to achieve a democratic political system. This transition has now become a political miracle, which outshines the island’s economic miracle.

At present, Taiwan thus fulfills all requirements of a nation-state: a defined territory, a population greater than that of 3/4 of the members of the UN, and a government which exercises effective control. It is a de facto independent nation, and deserves to be recognized as such.

The other reason why Taiwan’s international position hangs in limbo is the “creative ambiguity” of the formulation chosen by the United States and other nations in 1971/72. In the now well-known Shanghai Communiqué, the United States stated that it acknowledged — and thus simply took note of — the Chinese position (“..that there is but one China, and that Taiwan is part of China”). Does the wording of the Shanghai Communiqué mean that the US “recognized” or “accepted” the Chinese position? We hope your answer — like ours — is unequivocally no.
Mr. Clinton, we urge you strongly to hold the American principles of freedom, democracy, and self-determination high. We request you specifically 1) to express clearly that it is the right of the Taiwanese people to determine their own future, free from coercion by China; 2) to make it clear that you support Taiwan’s right to be a full member of the international family of nations, and 3) to reaffirm that — as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act — any threat to the safety and security of Taiwan is of grave concern to the US.

If such expressions are forthcoming on the occasion of your upcoming meeting with Mr. Jiang, then the Taiwanese-American community will continue its support for you, like it did before.

We look forward to hear from you. Sincerely yours,

(signed) Taiwanese Association of America, Taiwan Association for Human Rights, Formosan Association for Public Affairs, Center for Taiwan International Relations, and North American Taiwanese Medical Association.

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Safety and Security for Taiwan

Lessons from the Chinese missile crisis

The firings of Chinese missiles and the PLA military exercises in an area only 80 miles off the coast of Taiwan brought home a number of important lessons to the people of Taiwan, and to the international community in general.

To the Taiwanese people it meant that the promises of the Beijing authorities for “peaceful unification” under a “One country, two systems” approach (originally pronounced by Mr. Deng Xiao-ping in the early 1980s) are null and void. More recently, the Chinese authorities stated that they would “…fully respect the lifestyle, the legitimate rights and the interests of the 21 million ‘compatriots in Taiwan’ (Mr. Jiang Zemin’s “Eight-point-plan” of January 1995). It is now more clear than ever, that these are empty promises.
The missile crisis confirms the suspicions of most Taiwanese that the Chinese were never serious about the “peaceful” part of “unification”, and simply used it as a ploy to lure Taiwan into its smothering embrace.

The missile exercises also brought to light that, in spite of its strong economy, viable defense system, and evolving democracy, Taiwan does have a number of vulnerabilities:

1. Because many Taiwanese businessmen have investments in the coastal provinces of China, they eventually could become hostages to Chinese blackmail. As we reported in our previous issue (Taiwan Communiqué no. 67, p. 16), many Taiwanese businessmen are realizing this, and are shifting their investments to South-East Asia, to countries like Vietnam and the Philippines.

2. While Taiwan’s military is well-trained and well-equipped, China has a numerical superiority. Still, most US defense experts agree that China at present does not have the capability to invade Taiwan. Even a blockade of Taiwan by China would be ill-fated: it would evoke a strong reaction from the international community (in particular the US), and the Taiwanese have shown themselves adept at circumventing hurdles. It would also prompt a boycott of Chinese-made goods in both the United States as well as in Europe.

However, as was shown in the recent crisis, just because of its sheer size, China can have an impact — in Taiwan and beyond — just by rattling its sabers and by threatening and bullying.

3. A third vulnerability in Taiwan is ironically due to the evolving democratic system: while the old Kuomintang diehards, such as former Prime Minister Hao Pei-tsun,
have been relegated to the political sidelines, a new and dangerous strain of Chinese chauvinism has raised its head in the New Party, an extremist group which split off from the Kuomintang in August 1993. This pro-unificationist group presently has seven members in the Legislative Yuan, and has made vocal attacks against both President Lee Teng-hui and the DPP party.

In spite of these vulnerabilities, the missile crisis has brought a newfound cohesion and self-confidence to Taiwan. Recent opinion polls on the island show that between 80 and 90 percent of the Taiwanese would fight to defend Taiwan against China, and oppose China’s claims to sovereignty over the island. The country is proceeding with the election process for both the Legislative Yuan elections in December and the Presidential elections in March 1996, it is further strengthening its defense capabilities, and is continuing the efforts to raise its international profile.

Perspectives from Washington

The increasing military profile of China in East Asia, and the PLA exercises of course also caught the attention of researchers, analysts and policymakers in Washington and elsewhere.

On 13 September 1995, the DPP-mission in the US organized a conference titled “China’s threat, Taiwan’s preparedness, and issues for the United States.” At the meeting several prominent East Asia specialists presented analyses of the situation, and concluded that while China at the present time does not have the capabilities to seriously threaten Taiwan, the island would do well to strengthen its defenses, particularly in the area of missile defense (an upgraded Patriot system or the newly developed Theater Missile Defense system).

The meeting also concluded that the strongest argument for raising Taiwan’s international profile is the fact that the island is now moving towards a fully democratic political system.

During the past few months, China’s military adventurism also prompted several major articles and reports on the topic. We briefly mention a few of them:


Finally, the growth and role of China’s military prompted hearings on the issue in the US Congress: on 11 October 1995, the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, held a hearing at which both U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye testified.

Both gentlemen presented arguments in favor of the US’s present “engagement” approach, arguing that this would increase the transparency of China’s military system, and hopefully help steer China in the right direction.

Towards a stable balance in East Asia

Taiwan Communiqué comment: While there is general agreement that it would be desirable to have stability, peace, and security in East Asia, opinions differ on how to achieve this. Stability is not served by condoning China’s missile exercises. Peace is not achieved if the international community kowtows to Beijing. Security in East Asia continues to be at grave risk as long as China displays a penchant for expansionism.

The best way to achieve this much-desired stability, peace, and security in East Asia is for China to respect the rights of other nations around it and learn to live peacefully, side-by-side with Taiwan.

The best way for the international community, and particularly the United States and Western Europe, to assist in this process is to help bring the people of Taiwan out of the international diplomatic isolation into which the shortsighted policies of the Kuomintang have led the island, and to recognize a free and democratic Taiwan as an independent country.
Elections coming up -- again

December elections for Legislative Yuan

On 2 December 1995, the people of Taiwan will go to the polls for the elections for 164 seats in the Legislative Yuan. The results will be closely watched, both in Taiwan as well as overseas, because it will be a major indicator of the future political direction of the island: will the people continue to support the “status quo” policies of President Lee Teng-hui’s Kuomintang, or will they shift further in the direction of the DPP-party?

In the previous (1992) Legislative Yuan elections, the DPP grew to 31 percent of the votes (52 seats) — while the Kuomintang dropped from a level of near 80 percent in the 1980s to approximately 60 percent (96 seats). During more recent elections for local offices (in November 1993 and December 1994), the DPP increased its share of the votes to some 40 percent, while the Kuomintang was barely able to remain above 50 percent.

The main question for the upcoming elections is thus, whether the Kuomintang will lose its absolute majority and drop below 50 percent, and whether the DPP can achieve an increase to some 40 percent. The election will also be a precursor for the upcoming presidential election in March 1996: a significant shift in the direction of the DPP will increase the likelyhood of a neck and neck race between President Lee Teng-hui and the DPP’s candidate, Professor Peng Ming-min (see article on next pages).
It is uncertain yet how the balance between the Kuomintang and the DPP will be affected by the smaller parties and by the non-affiliated candidates: in the 1992 elections, some 14 percent of the votes went to candidates, which ran on an independent ticket, and did not associate themselves with either the KMT or the DPP. Forteen of these candidates were elected, constituting 8.7 percent of the seats.

In the meantime, there has also been the split-off of the pro-unificationist New Party from the Kuomintang. This group consists mainly of Chinese mainlanders, and the support it gets on the island is therefore limited, but their influence is considerable, because the New Party has several outspoken members in the Legislative Yuan, and has shown itself adept at getting the attention from the media.

DPP races to watch

A total of 122 seats are open for election in the regular districts, with 90 seats for Taiwan, 18 for Taipei and 12 for Kaohsiung, and two for Kinmen and Matsu. Of the remaining 42 seats, 30 are “at large” (to be allocated to the parties on the basis of the results in the regular districts), six set aside for overseas candidates, and six for aboriginal candidates.

The DPP has nominated a total of 70 candidates and hopes that at least 60 of these will be elected, an increase from the current level of 52 seats. Below we report on some of the interesting races in different parts of Taiwan.

In Taipei, the DPP has a slate of both old and new members: in Taipei South, the four DPP candidates, incumbent legislators Shen Fu-hsiung, Mrs. Yeh Chu-lan, and Mr. Yen Chin-fu, who are running for reelection, have agreed with the fourth candidate, Mr. Huang Tien-fu, to pool their resources together and run a joint election campaign. The four will appear together in all campaign rallies. They ask voters to distribute their votes evenly among the four. If this experiment works, then hopefully the four candidates will be all elected.

In Taipei North, the DPP nominated five candidates, including the former chairman of DPP, Mr. Chiang Peng-chien. Of the five candidates, three are newcomers.

In Chia-yi city, DPP legislator Chai Trong-rong’s reelection is facing an uphill battle, because his opponent, chairman of Mainland Affairs Council Mr. Vincent Siew, a native of Chiayi city, is a popular politician. Mr. Siew represented President Lee in two previous APEC meetings.
In Tainan city, the DPP nominated Dr. George Chang, the former chairman of World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), and Mr. Shih Ming-teh, the present chairman of DPP. Incumbent DPP legislator Hsu Tien-tsai, was not nominated by the DPP because he lost in the primary. Mr. Hsu has declared that he would withdraw from the DPP and run as an independent.

Two other candidates who were prominent in the overseas Taiwanese movement (respectively in the United States and Japan) are Professor Lee Ying-yuan, who returned to Taiwan in 1991, and is running in Taipei county, and Dr. Hsu Shih-kai, a former chairman of WUFI, who is running in Taichung City.

Mr. George Chang, whose campaign office opened in Tainan on 23 September 1995, was the subject of a number of attacks: first his office was broken into and vandalized. Unidentified individuals burned ghost paper money in front of his office to bring bad luck to his campaign. Then, on September 28, a fire broke out in the early morning, totally destroying the office. No one was injured, but all his campaign brochures, computers, equipment, furniture and name lists of supporters were destroyed. Mr. Chang suspects that political opponents had set the fire. In a press conference he said that he would not be intimidated and would rebuild his campaign headquarters and stay in the race.

Finally, on the offshore island of Penghu (the Pescadores), the DPP nominated Mr. Cheng Shao-liang, a Taiwanese-American computer engineer, who became a prominent artificial intelligence specialist while in the United States. He returned to Taiwan in 1993.

**Professor Peng is DPP’s candidate for Presidency**

On 25 September 1995, the DPP announced in a press conference in Taipei that it nominated professor Peng Ming-min to be its presidential candidate for the March 1996 elections. Professor Peng had won a lengthy marathon primary campaign, in which some 300,000 people participated. The primary consisted of 49 public debates in 23 cities and townships in a span of nearly three months. Prof. Peng’s opponent in the primary, Mr. Hsu Hsin-liang, the former chairman of DPP, pledged his full support to Prof. Peng’s presidential campaign.

Prof. Peng is a former professor of political science at National Taiwan University and a former political prisoner. He said that he accepted the presidential nomination as the greatest honor in his life.
The path from political prisoner to presidential candidate was certainly a rocky one. In 1964 at the peak of his academic career, Prof. Peng was arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison for publishing a manifesto advocating Taiwan independence, a political taboo then. He was kept under house arrest by the Kuomintang authorities for nearly five years, but in 1970 he made a dramatic escape from the island and received political asylum in Sweden. He subsequently moved to the United States, and was active in the overseas Taiwanese democratic movement. After more than 20 years’ exile, he returned to Taiwan in 1992, and joined the DPP in February of this year.

Professor Peng began his quest for the DPP presidential nomination without a power base. His campaign staff consisted mainly of university professors who did have limited experience in managing a political campaign. In contrast, his opponent Hsu Hsin-liang, the former county magistrate of Taoyuan, is an experienced politician whose staff are old-timers in political campaigns.

However, professor Peng turned out to be highly popular among the supporters of DPP. His statesmanlike image and his pioneering role in challenging the Kuomintang at such an early stage appealed to the Taiwanese voters who still have memories of his arrest and imprisonment in the late 1960s. In the end, Prof. Peng won with 177,477 votes (57.8%) against Hsu’s 129,816 votes (42.2%).

The day after Prof. Peng became DPP’s presidential candidate, he nominated DPP legislator Hsieh Chang-ting to be his running mate. Peng said that he nominated Hsieh for his youth, intellect, wit and political experience. Mr. Hsieh was a defense lawyer for the “Kaohsiung Eight” at the 1980 trial following the Kaohsiung incident of 1979. He also served in the Taipei City Council and the Legislative Yuan. He is a popular speaker known for his eloquence, humor and quick wit. He thus complements Prof. Peng in many respects.
The DPP introduces its election platform

At the end of September 1995, the DPP unveiled its election platform for the year-end legislative election and the March 1996 presidential election, in a celebration marking the ninth anniversary of the founding of the party. The 60,000-word platform entitled “give Taiwan a chance” is a DPP contract with the people of Taiwan. It outlines DPP’s policy proposals on major topics which the party considers important for the island’s future, including national identity, defense and security, foreign policy, Taiwan’s international status, political and economic reforms and social welfare.

On the sovereignty issue, the DPP maintains that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state, and opposes unification with mainland China. The sovereignty plank also calls for a redefinition of the national territory to reflect the present reality (the national territory to be defined as Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu), and refutes the claims that Taiwan is a part of China. Furthermore, it reiterates that Taiwan submits its application to join the United Nations under the name “Taiwan.”

The defense plank proposes to strengthen Taiwan’s ability to protect itself by increasing its defense capabilities, and by promoting cooperation with other South-East Asian nations in safeguarding regional security. The plank also argues for greater transparency in the affairs of the military, privatization of defense industries, and effective and reasonable management of the armed forces.

A democratic Taiwan: Is anyone listening ?!

By Lim Kokui, Legal Counsel, DPP-mission in the US

Recently, the chairman of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Mr. Shih Ming-teh, led a delegation of legislators and ranking DPP party members to Washington and New York to publicize the continuing military threat China poses to Taiwan’s democracy. The September 13 to 18 visit which included substantive conferences, meetings, press conferences, and public rallies underscored the pressing security concerns of Taiwan’s largest opposition political party.

As the United States’ fifth largest trading partner, a stable democratizing nation in Asia, and an economic powerhouse contributing to regional prosperity through capital
investments and direct financial aid to developing countries, Taiwan’s safety and security should be of great concern to Washington. At least, that is what the casual observer would expect. On the contrary, support for Taiwan, though forthcoming, was nonetheless cautious and hesitant. Why?

Simple, “China.” Indeed, some academics in Washington these days blame Taiwan for “antagonizing” China when the issue of the island’s sovereignty is discussed.

Increasingly, appeasement is apparently the norm being embraced in some academic and political circles here in Washington when dealing with Beijing. However, to find fault with Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party for advocating the island’s de jure independence is to find democracy itself erroneous. Rather than acknowledge that the DPP’s views on independence reflect the 40% of the popular vote it represents, some observers conclude that tension between China and Taiwan should lay squarely on the shoulders of Taiwan. This is an escapist approach which at best postpones the United States’ inevitable need to address the current crisis emerging from China’s attempts to reinstall its Imperial rule in East Asia.

The so-called Asia experts who advocate a “One-China Policy” in which Taiwan is relegated to being a “province” of China, are out of touch with today’s reality. Rather than look to outdated policies premised on a situation dating from the bad old days when Taiwan, too, was under a one party dictatorship, those interested parties need to reevaluate the situation - sans personal business interests, existing or potential - when discussing the “Taiwan question.”

Can any sound argument be made for the current “One China” policy? Doubtful. After all, Taiwan independence is a natural procession in the island’s democratization. What pundits fail to admit is that regardless whether Taiwanese choose to seek independence or not, China will pursue hegemony over the island, come hell or high water. Nor does the status quo favor Taiwan, as some would argue. Indeed, the status quo serves China’s interests by opening wide Taiwan’s existing window of vulnerability. It gives Beijing time to expand its military parity vis-à-vis Taiwan, further eroding Taiwan’s international standing, and weakening Washington’s long-term influence in the region. At best, it buys Washington a little bit more time to do nothing.

It is wholly inappropriate for Washington to wag its finger at Taiwan while ignoring China’s recent provocation by holding military exercises off the coast of Taiwan. That some scholars advocates that the U.S. avoid support for Taiwan’s self-determination,
or that other experts caution of war should Taiwan declare independence fails to address the heart of the matter: China’s threats against Taiwan’s democracy.

This begets the question, what is the United States’ responsibility? Surely, to ask Taiwan to sit idle because Washington is unwilling to stand up for the island is unacceptable for the reasons mentioned above. Rumors that the Clinton Administration will issue a fourth communiqué or its equivalent to placate Beijing only aggravate the situation. Washington’s experience of being beaten over the head by China with the three existing communiqués speaks volumes about the horrors a fourth communiqué portent.

For starters, Washington should abide by its 1979 Taiwan Relations Act which mandates that the United States make available adequate defensive weapons to safeguard Taiwan’s security. Chairman Shih’s comments that the Taiwanese wish to purchase advanced defensive arms to maintain the military parity across the Taiwan Strait and deter a Chinese invasion are valid.

Commentators’ fears that Washington’s sale of advanced defensive arms to Taiwan will incite an arms race with China are misplaced. China is not a rational power playing by the rules of international civility. Any cursory review of China’s alarming military buildup, arms procurement from Russia, sale of nuclear technology to Iran, testing of nuclear weapons, or territorial expansion into the South China Seas should convince the casual observer of otherwise.

That Chairman Shih would make a visit to Washington to alert our U.S. counterparts about the growing China threat in the region underscores the seriousness with which we view China’s unjust claims.

Next, the United States should make it clear its support for the outcome of Taiwan’s democratization process. The United States has been midwife to Taiwan’s maturing democracy. In fact, Taiwan’s 21 million people will exercise the right of suffrage next March in the island’s unprecedented first direct presidential election. The forthcoming election and its precipitating developments are exercises in democracy reflecting a trend in Taiwanese society which the DPP and Chairman Shih represent, the right of Taiwanese to govern Taiwan.

Moreover, the election has greater implications than at first appear, implications that have not gone unnoticed by Beijing. After the March 1996 elections, Taiwan will have
all the elements of a sovereign, democratic nation — including a democratically-elected head of state — severing once and for all any tenuous claim Beijing may assert over Taiwan.

Should Taiwan seek to assert its independence? United Nations membership? How about asking Taiwan’s 21 million people? This is what will happen in the upcoming presidential elections. Should we cancel these elections?! After all, this is what”antagonizes” Beijing the most. Of course not: Taiwan is a democracy, and democracy dictates that we ask the Taiwanese people.

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Report from Washington

During the past two months, members of both the US House of Representatives and the Senate wrote letters to President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher to express their concern for Taiwan’s safety and security. The moves were obviously prompted by China’s belligerent behavior and by the missile crises of July and August.

On the Senate side, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Connecticut) is planning to introduce a Resolution urging President Clinton to review Taiwan’s defense needs, in accordance with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8). Below we present some excerpts from the letters and the text of the Resolution.

Congressional concern about Taiwan policy

One of the earliest and strongest expressions of concern came on 26 August 1995, from three members of the US House of Representatives, Messrs. Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Peter Deutsch (D-Fl), and Robert Torricelli (D-NJ). In a letter to Secretary of State Christopher, the three Congressmen termed the Chinese missile tests “...a threat to international peace”, and stated that it represented “...the continued failure of the current Beijing government to respond positively to our policy of constructive engagement.” They urged the US government “...not to reward such irresponsible behavior on the part of the current government in Beijing.”

The three Congressmen further stated that “In an increasingly interdependent world, tension between Taiwan and China is hardly a Chinese internal affair .... Rather, the rising tension between Taiwan and China is a legitimate concern to the entire international community.”
They also emphasized: “What escapes many observers in the United States is the simple fact that Taiwan is not part of China. Instead, it fulfills all international law conditions for statehood. Since the Nationalist fled to Taiwan in 1949, the communists have not exercised any control over Taiwan — even for one day.”

The three Congressmen then stated: “Indeed, we believe that Taiwan is an independent sovereign country. The reliance on a “One China” formulation by both the ruling party in Taiwan and the Communist Party in China serves each group’s narrow political agenda’s, but it is ultimately unrealistic. This outmoded approach to a decidedly sensitive issue now jeopardizes the safety, security and livelihood of 21 million people in Taiwan. Therefore it is of utmost importance that all sides begin to withdraw from the unrealistic “One China Policy” claims.”

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The three also criticized the State Department’s lame argument — made during a 3 August 1995 hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Committee — that the July missile tests did not constitute a threat to Taiwan. Quoting Committee Chair Benjamin Gilman, they asked which distance would constitute an imminent threat, and when the State Department would take action: “Tests within 80 miles or 50 miles of Taiwan’s coast, or what?”

The three concluded their letter by stating that they appreciated the complexity of the issue and the delicacy with which the United States must approach it, but that they believed that “…the interests of international peace and the fate of 21 million people in Taiwan should not be held hostage by the truculent mindset of the current government in Beijing.” They also emphasized that in shaping its own policy on Taiwan, the United States “…should not be intimidated in any way by the belligerent actions of the Beijing gerontocracy.”

A second letter was written by several House members to President Clinton in the beginning of October 1995. In this letter, the signatories criticized the hostile conduct of the PRC, which was designed to “...intimidate both Taipei and Washington into changing our relations.” The signatories stated: “We want to express to you in the
strongest terms our conviction that American policy cannot be coerced by Beijing’s bluster.... In no way should we allow the PRC to dictate the terms of US-Taiwan relations.”

Referring to the upcoming meeting between Mr. Clinton and Mr. Jiang Zemin, the signatories urged Mr. Clinton “...to reinforce the American commitment to Taiwan and our displeasure with recent Chinese intimidation tactics.”

The signatories also spoke out against a “Fourth Communiqué”, saying that in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the US simply acknowledged the Chinese view that there is but one China. However, this in no way obliges the US to undercut Taiwan’s legitimate moves over two decades later to play a stronger role in the international arena.

Finally, on 10 October 1995, US Senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Larry Pressler (R-South Dakota) initiated a letter to President Clinton in which they strongly condemned the Chinese missile tests as “...unwarranted and alarming military muscle-flexing, designed to intimidate the people of Taiwan and provoke a reaction in the international community.”

The Senators stated: “We are concerned about the destabilizing effects of these actions on the security of the East Asia region, and on the free exercise of democratic rights by the people of Taiwan. The PRC’s actions had a clear and detrimental impact on Taiwan’s security.”

The Senators then referred to the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the President to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security of the people of Taiwan, and discuss with Congress the appropriate measures to be taken by the US.

They concluded by stating: “Aggressive, unprovoked actions and undisguised threats by a non-democratic power against an emerging democracy in east Asia are clearly detrimental to the national interest of the United States as well as those of US allies in the region.”

Resolution on Safety and Security of Taiwan

In the middle of October 1995, there were indications in Washington that several prominent members of the US Senate, including Mr. Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) were considering introducing a Resolution to express their concern about safety and security for Taiwan. As this issue of Taiwan Communiqué was going to press, the draft text of the Resolution was as follows:
Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should express its concern about the safety and security of Taiwan

Whereas United States’ interests are served by supporting democracy abroad;

Whereas Taiwan is a model emerging democracy, with a virtually free press, free and fair elections, and stable and democratic institutions;

Whereas United States’ interests are best served by policies that treat democratic leaders with respect and dignity;

Whereas the Congress of the United States voted near unanimously to welcome the President of Taiwan to visit the United States;

Whereas, from July 21 until July 26 and from August 15 until August 25, 1995, the People’s republic of China carried out a series of surface-to-surface ballistic missile tests, live artillery tests, and joint air and sea forces combat exercises in the seas 80 miles off the coast of Taiwan to protest the visit to the United States of Taiwan’s President;

Whereas these combat exercises caused serious concern for the safety and security of the people of Taiwan;

Whereas, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is obliged to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient defense capability;

Therefore be it Resolved that the United States Senate; the House of Representatives Concurring —

1. Declares that any attempt by the People’s Republic of China to threaten the safety and security of Taiwan is a matter of grave concern to the United States; and

2. Calls upon the President of the United States to review the defense needs of Taiwan, in accordance with the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public law 96-8).