Tsai Ing-wen presidential candidate

On Wednesday 15 April 2015, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen formally became the DPP’s candidate for the January 2016 presidential elections in Taiwan. At a meeting of the party’s Central Executive Committee she received the overwhelming support of the party.

At a press conference immediately following the meeting, Dr. Tsai outlined her vision for Taiwan, emphasizing that development of relations across the Taiwan Strait should be subject to the will of the people of Taiwan, and could not be undertaken as party-to-party negotiations – a direct criticism of the ruling Kuomintang party, which has used KMT-CCP meetings as the main venue for communications.

She also stated that if elected, she and her party will maintain the status quo in relations with China, emphasizing that peace and stability across the Strait should be the common goal of the people in Taiwan and in China. She added that the party’s intent was “…to establish a complete framework for the continuation of cross-Strait negotiations” and that she wanted to work towards “…a more sustainable, more democratic track, based solidly upon the public will” – a reference to the

DPP Chairwoman Dr. Tsai Ing-wen: Presidential candidate once again
fact that the Ma government regularly developed new initiatives in secret, bypassing the legislature in implementing them.

Not unexpectedly, the PRC reacted rather negatively: less than an hour after Tsai’s speech, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office issued a statement, telling the DPP to adhere to the “1992 consensus” and the “one China principle”, and not to push for independence (see further discussion on these topics below).

### Crucial presidential election race takes shape

Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election thus promises to be an exciting one, in particular after the major defeat of the ruling Kuomintang in the November 2014 municipal elections (see *Taiwan Communiqués* no. 148 and 149). After these local elections virtually all major population centers are ruled by DPP mayors and county magistrates, while the Kuomintang only holds sway in one densely populated area: Sinbei City (formerly Taipei County) where newly elected KMT party chairman “Eric” Chu Li-luen won, but only narrowly.

The KMT party has not nominated its candidate yet. Current president Ma Ying-jeou cannot run, as Taiwan has a term limit of two terms. The party is at this point still working out its nomination rules, which will presumably state that the party will conduct polls on who would be the strongest candidate, and then nominate the person with the highest score.

Several candidates have been mentioned, including deputy legislative speaker Ms. Hung Hsiu-chu, legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng and vice-president Wu Den-yih, but none of those would stand much of a chance in a race against the DPP’s Dr. Tsai Ing-wen.

The person who does score highest in most polls is KMT Chairman “Eric” Chu Li-luen himself, but he has stated that he will not run, as he wants to complete his terms as county magistrate in Sinbei City. Many observers in Taiwan expect that in due time he will have no choice but to run, as he is the only candidate who would have any chance in a race against Tsai. In a recent poll by the KMT-leaning *United Daily News*, Tsai received 42% while Chu garnered only 34% of the vote.

### Legislative candidates juggle for position

In the meantime, candidates in both the KMT and DPP – and several other smaller parties (see below) – are juggling for position in the elections for the Legislative Yuan, which will be held at the same time as the presidential election, 16 January 2016.
At the moment, the Kuomintang holds 63 seats in the legislative body, the DPP has 40, the Taiwan Solidarity Union three and the Peoples First party two legislators, with the remainder going to independents, not affiliated with any political parties. Many observers, particularly the young activists in the Sunflower movement, feel that the legislative elections are as important, if not more important, than the presidential elections, as their outcome will determine whether Taiwan can push for constitutional, legislative and judicial reforms (see below).

The juggling takes place at several levels: first a party needs to decide who will run where for the 73 single-seat districts. This is a time-consuming jigsaw puzzle requiring much diplomacy. In some cases it is obvious who the appropriate candidate for a particular district would be, but in other cases there might be several candidates. Both major parties have developed sophisticated polling methods to determine who is most likely to win, but often disgruntled losers persist and run as independents.

Second, the parties need to decide on their roster of candidates for the 34 proportional seats, which are allocated to parties on the basis of the percentage they receive in the overall vote. In order to have representatives in the legislature, a party must obtain at least five percent of the vote. In the 2012 election, both the Taiwan Solidarity Union and the People’s First Party met this criterion and were able to each send three legislators to the Legislative Yuan.

These proportional seats are often an opportunity for a party to put members with a national standing in the legislature, or position specialists in areas like the environment or nuclear power. By running prominent figures in higher positions, the parties present their main themes and policy focus. However, the election law also requires that the parties run candidates in at least ten of the single-seat district races.

This time, the races for the proportional seats will be hard-fought, as there are a number of new players on the field (see below).
New political parties enter the fray

Since the event of the Sunflower Movement in March/April 2014, several new political parties have been announced. Most of them are offspring of the Sunflower movement. A total of 14 parties have registered since July 2014, but only two or three are likely to make any inroads. A brief overview of those that could:

* The New Power Party (NPP) established in January 2015 by Chthonic HeavyMetal band singer Freddy Lim and Ms. Hung Tzu-yung, the younger sister of conscript Hung Chung-chiu, whose death in military custody in July 2013 prompted large-scale demonstrations against bureaucracy in the military. The NPP also has received the endorsement of former DPP heavyweight Lin Yi-hsiung.

* The Social Democratic Party (SDP) founded by National Taiwan University professor and women’s rights activist Fan Yun on 29 March 2015. The party is modeled after the European social democratic parties, and aims to gain five seats in the legislator-at-large / proportional seats elections.

DPP chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen has indicated she is interested in working with the new parties in trying to gain a majority in the legislature, so as to be able to push through progressive reforms.

No consensus on the “1992 Consensus”

During the past two months, the debate on the so-called “1992 Consensus” has heated up in Taiwan. The term refers to the presumed outcome of a 1992 meeting between two organizations that were established at the time to conduct unofficial interactions between China and Taiwan, China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF).

Former President Lee Teng-hui, who was Taiwan’s president at the time, has denied there was ever such a consensus, and former National Security Council secretary-general Su Chi admitted in 2006 that he invented the term in 2000. The government of President Ma Ing-jeou is now clinging to the term, saying that it constitutes the “basis” for peaceful relations across the Taiwan Strait since he came to power in 2008.
President Ma clings to “1992 Consensus”

Under the definition promulgated by the Ma administration, the “1992 Consensus” implies that both sides accept there is one China, but have different interpretations on what that “one China” signifies or encompasses. In the anachronistic definition of the KMT, “one China” means the “Republic of China” established by the Chinese Nationalists in 1911. In their view, “the mainland” is part of that China.

The PRC’s definition is of course very different: it only emphasizes the “one China principle” (negating any different interpretations), according to which Taiwan has always been an “inalienable” part of China throughout its history. A cursory examination of Taiwan’s history of course shows that this is simply not the case: it was ruled by the Dutch from 1624 through 1662, while before the Dutch there was virtually no Chinese presence on the island: only the native aborigines, who are of Malay-Polynesian descent. And from 1895 through 1945 the island was ruled by Japan.

In spite of their very different and contradicting interpretations, the KMT and CCP have both used this vague construct to push Taiwan onto a one-way sliding slope towards unification. And as we see below, President Xi Jinping recently even significantly moved the goalposts on Beijing’s definition.

These ominous designs are now colliding head-on with the democratic aspirations of the Taiwanese people and their desire to be accepted as a full and equal member in the international community. These Taiwanese views are most clearly articulated by the democratic opposition of the DPP and the young generation of Sunflower leaders. Below we present remarks on this issue by DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen.
**President Xi Jinping moves the goalposts**

On 04 March 2015, in a meeting with members of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that the 1992 Consensus was the “basis of, and prerequisite to, our interaction with the Taiwan authorities and any political parties.”

He added that if the “common political basis” were to be challenged, “trust will no longer exist and relations would regress back to the past when they were volatile and unstable.” Xi also asserted that the consensus meant that the mainland and Taiwan are indivisible components of one China.

By redefining the 1992 Consensus in this way, President Xi left no room whatsoever for “different interpretations”, a point always emphasized by the KMT’s Ma administration. As was elaborated in two excellent recent articles:

* J. Michael Cole: *China demolishes the Taiwan Consensus*, **Thinking Taiwan**, 11 March 2015, and
* Parris Chang: *Moving the Consensus Goalposts*, **Taipei Times** 12 March 2015

China is now attempting to put pressure on the democratic opposition of the DPP to lock into this “Consensus” in the run up to the January 2016 presidential elections. Beijing is finding a willing collaborator in President Ma and his government, but the main question is of course, how will the general populace in Taiwan perceive this development?

**Tsai Ing-wen vows to maintain the status quo**

In response to the mounting pressure from both Beijing and Ma Ying-jeou’s government to accept the 1992 Consensus and Beijing’s “One China principle”, the DPP convened a meeting of its China Affairs Committee on 9 April 2015, at which Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen made the following statement:

*In recent days there has been intense interest both at home and abroad in the development of the DPP’s cross-strait policy. We fully understand and appreciate that if the DPP is to return to government, the responsibility of managing the relationship across the strait will be a challenging task. But we have confidence that we can manage cross-strait relations in a way that avoids surprises, and we certainly would not provoke contradictions, conflict, or confrontation.*
As a political party actively preparing to return to government, we willingly assume the responsibility of clearly explaining our basic approach and position:

First of all, the basis for our handling of cross-strait relations is “maintaining the status quo,” preserving cross-strait peace, and continuing the current stable development of the cross-Strait relations. This is the core of the cross-Strait relationship, as well as the goal for the DPP upon returning to power.

Dr. Tsai Ing-wen and her team of DPP city mayors and county magistrates

Cross-Strait relations should not be limited to KMT-CCP relations. If Beijing could break out of the KMT-CCP framework, and treat whichever party comes to power in the future in Taiwan on an equal basis in a friendly manner for the sake of maintaining the status quo of peaceful development in cross-Strait ties and the status quo of cross-Strait consultations and exchanges, then we can return to a steady path amidst an atmosphere of calm.

We are well aware that in the current phase, there are still differences in the development across the strait. Taiwan is a democratic society encompassing diverse voices, and any leader regardless of party must include those different voices and opinions to seek the greatest internal consensus. If the two sides can reach this kind of mutual understanding to find the greatest common denominator, it would surely open up new possibilities for cross-Strait relations.

Moreover, the DPP understands very clearly that a return to government means shouldering the responsibility to the international community of maintaining
cross-strait peace. We fully understand and take very seriously the U.S. administration’s interest in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, and are happy to exchange views with the U.S. side about how best to handle the cross-strait issue should we return to government. Our substantive interactions with the U.S. will also continue to proceed, both before the 2016 election and after.

We hope that all different sectors can continue to take a holistic view of what the DPP does in regard to cross-strait policy, and in building long-term interactions and trust with the U.S. The DPP will strengthen mutual trust with the U.S. and let this trust become a positive force in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We fully recognize that Taiwan’s democracy is precious because it embodies the essence of popular sovereignty. The collective will of the people with regard to cross-strait development is the criteria that any government must follow.

What is at stake in cross-strait relations are the interests and long-term prosperity of 23 million people. The predominant desire among Taiwan’s people is to see the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, while also safeguarding Taiwan’s democratic values and future autonomy. To the people of Taiwan the DPP makes this firm pledge: **we will maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and we will safeguard Taiwan’s democratic values and future autonomy.** We are confident in our ability to secure cross-Strait peace and stability amidst the current complex international dynamics, and to preserve the greatest possible space and choice for the next generation (emphasis added – TC).

The DPP will address the core issues in cross-strait relations accordingly. As long as we are fully cognizant of the responsibility, secure in our basic position, respectful of the public’s will, and sincerely resolved to develop communications and solve problems, we will be able to move past the obstacles step by step to chart out a path for cross-strait relations that accords with Taiwan’s interest while being acceptable to all sides.
Sunflowers celebrate first anniversary
"Let the people decide"

Between 18 March and 10 April 2015, a number of commemorations were held in Taipei, celebrating the first anniversary of the Sunflower movement: the 23-day occupation of the Legislative Yuan one year ago that completely changed the political landscape in Taiwan.

First, on the morning of Wednesday 18 March 2015, a number of leaders of the Sunflower movement revisited some of the landmarks of the event one year ago. While they focused on continued concern about the drift of the Ma government towards China, the speakers called for constitutional and legislative reforms (see below), and for passage of a substantive Cross-Strait Oversight Bill, which had been one of the main demands in March–April 2014, but which is still languishing in the legislature.

In the evening of the same day, a larger group of some 1,000 people congregated on Chinan Road next to the legislative compound to celebrate the Sunflower movement’s first anniversary with speeches by prominent social activists, and more than a dozen stands promoting the ideas and programs of the different civic organizations.

Human rights lawyer Lai Chung-chiang, one of the speakers, said that the government’s version of the Oversight Bill is “designed to prevent any meaningful oversight.” In total there are eight versions of the bill, ranging from the government’s toothless version to more substantive versions proposed by the DPP and civic organizations.

At one point, the participants pushed a large balloon over the walls of the legislative compound with the characters “constitutional reform” emblazoned on its side.
A few days later, on 23 March 2015, a group of several dozen student and activists held a silent procession around the Executive Yuan compound, the site where one year ago on that date, riot police used batons and water cannons to clear a group of peaceful demonstrators from the premises of the Executive Yuan, resulting in some 200 injuries.

However, instead of prosecuting the riot police on charges of violence against peaceful demonstrators, the judicial authorities in February 2015 filed charges against 93 students and activists for their role in the “324” events (see Taiwan Communiqué no. 149, p. 13-15).

And, finally, on 10 April 2015—the day that the Sunflowers left the Legislative Yuan in 2014—several activist groups that were established after the Sunflower movement returned to the Legislative Yuan and in their speeches urged constitutional, legislative and judicial reforms to bring Taiwan more in line and in tune with the 21st century.

The Constitution, legislative structure and judicial system are still based on the system established by the Chinese Nationalists in the early part of the 20th century in China, hardly appropriate for Taiwan now.

In a parade on the street, the participants walked in a formation in the shape of the Hanji characters for “Let the people decide” symbolizing a strong criticism of the current system under President Ma Ying-jeou in which there are few ways for the people to streamline and reform the political system so it becomes more responsive.

The protesters in particular called for changes in the Referendum Law (see below) and Election and Recall Law, to lower the threshold for referenda, and also to streamline the cumbersome process to recall legislators and other officials.
The April 10th gathering was organized by Taiwan March, the main group formed by the Sunflower leaders after the events of March/April 2014, and supported by the People Rule Foundation (established by former DPP Chairman Lin Yi-hsiung after his hunger strike in April 2014 – See Taiwan Communiqué no. 146, pp. 12-17), and by the Appendectomy Project, that started the campaign to remove hardline KMT legislators from office (See Taiwan Communiqué no. 149, pp. 16-17).

The Constitutional reform debate

Since early January 2015, there has been a lively “constitutional reform” debate in Taiwan. This was largely prompted by the outcome of the November 2014 municipal elections, which brought to the surface a large amount of discontent with the governance of current President Ma Ying-jeou.

For several years, a number of civic groups had urged constitutional reform in several areas, but President Ma and the immediate circle around him had dismissed these efforts and had not been responsive to the recommendations. The disastrous results for the KMT of these elections thus brought to light a groundswell of discontent with the present system and the present way of doing things.

Also helping the debate was the fact that the new chairman of the Kuomintang, Mr. Eric Chu Li-luen – elected on 17 January 2015 – saw that the system of checks-and-balances in the government were not working very well, and started to advocate reforms himself.

In terms of process of the debate: the KMT and DPP did agree on the formation of a 39-member Constitutional Amendment Committee in the Legislative Yuan, made up of
22 KMT lawmakers and 14 DPP lawmakers. They also agreed to schedule 10 public hearings before the lawmakers will debate the reforms in committee. This whole process is supposed to be completed by July 2015, so any changes can take effect before the next presidential and legislative elections in January 2016.

Objections against these procedures came primarily from civic groups, such as the newly formed National Constitutional Reform Alliance and the Civic Alliance to Promote Constitutional Reform, who felt left out: in the earlier phases of the debate there was talk about a broad-based national affairs conference, but president Ma has not wanted to convene such a conference, leading to more charges that his administration lacks transparency.

The main themes being discussed in the broader debate are:

* **Enhance checks and balances** between the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan: Taiwan presently has a hybrid semi-Presidential system, which gives the President (in the eyes of many) too much power: the legislature can invite the (presidentially-appointed) Prime Minister for an interpellation at the legislature, but cannot have a vote of no-confidence. Some argue for a more formal legislative system, where the Prime Minister needs the support of the majority of the legislature, and can be voted out by the Legislative Yuan.

* In connection with the first theme: there are wide-ranging discussions whether the Legislative Yuan should be enlarged, and whether the legislators should be elected differently, especially whether there should be more proportional seats, which would give smaller parties a better chance: currently only 34 out of 113 seats are elected through a proportional vote.

* **Lower the legal voting age to 18**, and the minimum age for elected officials to 20 years of age. This proposal seems to have broad support and is likely to pass.

* A number of people have also advocated to abolishing the Control Yuan and Examination Yuan (folding their functions into those of the three other branches) and move to a more standard three branches of government: executive, legislative and judicial.

* For many civic organizations it is also important to **lower the threshold for constitutional amendment referenda and also for “regular” referenda**, as the current rules require a majority of 50% of registered voters to express themselves on a proposal for it to pass.

On the next few pages we elaborate on some of these issues.
The presidential or the parliamentary system?

While there is broad agreement on both sides of the political spectrum in Taiwan that the current system of checks and balances is not functioning very well, there is no consensus yet on what changes should be made. The DPP is proposing an enlargement of the number of seats in the Legislative Yuan, and progressive reform, moving to a system with more proportional representation.

Within the Kuomintang, there are major differences: President Ma wants to keep the system more or less as is, but KMT Party chairman Eric Chu Li-luen is sensitive to the criticism that the present quasi-presidential system is leading to deadlock and is therefore dysfunctional, and has proposed a number of changes.

The main change proposed by Mr. Chiu, and agreed to by the KMT legislative caucus on 27 March 2015 is that the legislature will have the power to confirm – or not — the prime minister appointed by the president. The KMT is apparently anticipating that the DPP will win the presidential elections in 2016, but hopes that it can still maintain a majority in the legislature. With such a change, the legislature would be in a much stronger position vis-à-vis the president and his/her appointed prime minister.

The changes proposed by the KMT also include making it possible for lawmakers to serve as cabinet ministers, which is common in the British system, but not consistent with the separation of powers under Taiwan’s semi-presidential system. The KMT also opposes enlarging the legislature and redistricting, as proposed by the DPP.

During his campaign for the position of chairman, Mr. Chu did voice support for constitutional reform designed to move Taiwan’s system of government to a parliamentary system. He added that he would be willing to sit down with opposition parties in order to push for reforms needed to implement a new system which would provide for a better balance between the executive and legislative branches.
Changing the Referendum Law

A second main theme in the discussion is lowering the threshold for constitutional amendment referenda and also for “regular” referenda, as the current rules require a majority of *registered voters* to express themselves for a proposal to pass.

For constitutional amendment referenda, the threshold will in all likelihood remain high, but there is a groundswell of public opinion in favor of lowering the bar for regular referenda, which are stipulated in *Article 30 of the Referendum Act*:

*In regards to the result of voting for a proposal of referendum, if the number of voters reaches no less than 1/2 of the total persons having the right of voting in the country, municipality or county (city) and more than 1/2 of the valid ballots agree, the proposal is adopted.*

*If the number of voters does not reach the quantity prescribed in the preceding Paragraph or the consenters are not more than 1/2 of the valid ballots, the proposal is vetoed.*

This “double thresholds” means that more than half of the eligible voters should cast their votes AND more than half of the valid votes should say they agree with the referendum question. Past referendum showed that the 50% turnout has been an insurmountable hurdle. It was easy for the KMT to counter-mobilize the voters simply by telling them to stay home or refrain from casting their ballot for the referendum. If this rule were in effect in the United States, not a single referendum would pass.

The DPP and civic groups are now proposing that the turnout threshold should be removed or lowered so that the referendum result would be decided by simple plurality.

President Ma Ying-jeou’s Executive Yuan has maintained the position that wants to keep the double threshold, but there are signs that the government may want to reduce the thresholds for *proposing* a referendum: at this point this involves a complicated two-stage process by which a petition proposing to hold a particular referendum first requires 0.5% of the voters in the previous presidential election.

This petition is then submitted to a 21-member Referendum Evaluation Committee which can accept or reject the proposal. If it is accepted, then it needs to go through a second stage in which the petition needs at least 5% of the voters in the previous presidential
Taiwan election. If it passes that hurdle then it is submitted to the Review Committee, which can still reject it on “technical” grounds.

The process of amending the Referendum Law is moving forward: the Ministry of Interior will hold public hearings in the second half April 2015, while civic organizations are mounting the pressure on the government to reduce the thresholds and even abolish the Referendum Evaluation Committee, which has shown it bias in the past.

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Report from Washington

Undersecretary Wendy Sherman’s Taiwan remarks

By Gerrit van der Wees, editor of Taiwan Communiqué. This article was first published in the Taipei Times on 08 March 2015. Reprinted with permission.


Overall, it was a good speech, emphasizing that the US is committed to engage with Northeast Asia—Japan, Korea and China. She said that the US has a sustained, well-resourced, high-level engagement with the region, and that the rebalance is a “recognition of reality. America’s security and prosperity are inextricably and increasingly linked with the Asia-Pacific.”

However, Taiwan was hardly mentioned: Only once during the speech did she refer to the nation, saying China has complaints about US friendship with the people of Taiwan. When someone in the question-and-answer session asked about that, Sherman said that it “is a good sign” that Taiwan is not talked about as much as it once was.

This might be true, but Sherman, and the US, can do better than that: Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, which is under an existential threat from across the Taiwan Strait by its large
and undemocratic neighbor, China. Given these circumstances, it would have been nice if the speech had mentioned Taiwan as a shining example of democracy.

As it was, Sherman did say that “the concept of one China and the Three Communiqués has become a standard, that the economic integration between Taiwan and mainland China is quite so — it is the status quo that the political issues are worked out over time.”

There are a number of problems with that statement. First, the “One China, Three Communiques” mantra might have become standard in the repeated recitations of US officials, but it perpetuates an outdated concept dating to the 1970s, which keeps Taiwan dangling in international isolation. For the people in a vibrantly democratic Taiwan, this is becoming less of a tenable position. Taiwanese ask: “Why can’t we be treated like any other country in the international family of nations?”

Second, whether the economic integration between Taiwan and China is the “status quo” is highly debatable: The Sunflower movement and the results of the local elections in November last year show very clearly that the large majority of the people of Taiwan reject the policies of the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou, which push Taiwan into a closer economic embrace with China.

It was precisely on this topic that former US secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton, in an interview with Taiwan Business Weekly on June 18 last year, warned Taiwan against economic over-dependence on China, saying that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government’s push for closer cross-strait ties could lead to Taiwan losing its economic and political independence, and leave it vulnerable to an over-reliance on China.

A third point not mentioned by Sherman is Taiwan’s strategic importance: It is located right between the South China Sea and the East China Sea — two areas of major tension where China is aggressively pushing the envelope — and is therefore a key link in the US’ security chain in the region. So, what we would have liked to see in the speech is a bit more vision about Taiwan’s strategic importance and its future.

In her speech, Sherman referred to the “lofty nature of UN ideals” and that it was “the handiwork of clear-eyed realists [who] … saw as their most urgent job the development of institutions that would keep nations from once again ripping each other apart.”

To the people of Taiwan, the most poignant injustice in Western policies is that they are still not treated as an equal member in the international community, and excluded from the institutions Sherman holds so high.
The “process versus specific outcome” debate

By Mark Kao, President of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs. This article was first published in the Taipei Times on 28 March 2015. Reprinted with permission.

At a seminar at the Heritage Foundation in Washington on 20 March 2015, former American Institute in Taiwan Washington office managing director Barbara Schrage spoke about US-Taiwan relations since the nine-in-one elections in November last year.

She described the outcome of the elections as a political landslide for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and a major defeat for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). She said that this outcome showed the strength of Taiwan’s democracy and that this would increase the US’ commitment to the nation’s safety and security.

She continued by saying that as Taiwan is a democracy, it would not be appropriate for the US to interfere. However, she then said that the DPP needed to formulate a China policy, adding that “vague formulations” would not suffice.

It is peculiar that she accused the DPP of “vague formulations,” while the present so-called “1992 consensus” is an extremely opaque concept that has many different interpretations. If Schrage were evenhanded and fair-minded, she should also discuss the vagueness of the “1992 consensus.”

It is also rather incomprehensible that Schrage implores the DPP to “reduce the differences between the two sides.” Such a statement fails to take into account the uncompromising position taken by Beijing, which has set acceptance of the so-called “one China” principle as a precondition for any negotiations.
In recent statements at the National People’s Congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping negated even the “1992 consensus” by emphasizing only “one China” and rejecting any “different interpretations.”

However, Schrage really crossed the line when, in the question-and-answer session, she commented on the September 2011 visit of DPP Chairperson and then-presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen, criticizing her for emphasizing the (democratic) “process” and not a “specific outcome.”

Schrage said that the US administration had wanted to hear her specific plans for managing cross-strait relations, adding: “Frankly speaking, she was disappointing in that area.”

In its own policies toward Taiwan, the US only talks about “process”: It emphasizes that in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the US insists on a “peaceful process,” and that there is a democratic process, in which decisions on the nation’s future should be made with the consent/assent of the people of Taiwan.

The US has never suggested any specific outcome, saying that it supports neither unification nor independence. It has also said that Taiwan’s current status is undetermined (in accordance with the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty), but emphasizes that its future status needs to be determined peacefully, without outside interference. So it feels somewhat ironic that Schrage faults Tsai for doing precisely what the US is doing.

Of course, everyone wants to avoid tension with Beijing. As Taiwanese-Americans, we are confident that — when elected in January next year — a DPP government will play a constructive role in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

However, the US must stand clearly on the side of democracy and freedom in Taiwan, and ensure that Taiwanese can make a free choice on their future. There is no room for ambiguity. Indeed, comments from people like Schrage should focus on convincing Beijing to present a formula that can “narrow its differences with Taiwan.”

Taiwanese cherish their democracy, wish to maintain their freedom and want to be accepted as a full and equal member in the international family of nations.
In memoriam

Composer Hsiao Tyzen (1938-2015)

On 24 February 2015, well-known Taiwanese composer Hsiao Tyzen passed away at his home in Los Angeles. During the past 30 years, Hsiao had gained fame for his masterworks, and became known as “Taiwan’s Rachmaninoff” after the famed Russian composer and pianist.

Hsiao was born in Kaohsiung in 1938, studied at National Taiwan University and Musashino Music University in Japan, and moved to the United States in 1977. He continued his musical works, and became well-known for his fusion of Taiwanese folk melodies and international music traditions. He composed works for solo instruments, chamber ensembles, solo voices, full orchestras, and choirs with soloists. Many of his vocal works were set to poems written in Taiwanese.

His most famous works included three concertos composed from 1988 to 1990: 1947 Overture (in memory of the 228 Massacre of some 28,000 Taiwanese by Chiang Kai-shek’s troops in 1947), Love Taiwan (which prompted him to be blacklisted by the KMT government), and Formosan Angels.

He also put to music a poem by the late Rev. “John” Tin Jyi-giokk (1922-2014), titled Taiwan the Green / Taiwan the Formosa. As mentioned in our previous Taiwan Communiqué, that song is widely sung among proponents of a free and democratic Taiwan, and has become the unofficial Taiwan national anthem.

Hsiao had been diagnosed with lung cancer in 2012, but despite his illness continued to make appearances at concert performances of his music in the Los Angeles area, including fundraising events for the Taiwan Center Foundation of Greater Los Angeles. A memorial service was held for him at the Shepherds of the Valley Presbyterian Church in Hacienda Heights on 14 March 2015.
Book Review

The Colonial ‘Civilizing Process’ in Dutch Formosa
By Professor Chiu Hsin-hui, reviewed by Gerrit van der Wees

In earlier issues of Taiwan Communiqué we discussed historical works by Antonio Andrade on the Dutch period in Taiwan (Communiqué no. 128 and 138), and by José Eugenio Borao Mateo on the Spanish period (Communiqué no. 127).

This book is by Professor Chiu Hsin-hui, a Taiwanese scholar at National Tsing Hua University in Hsinchun who did her dissertation at the University of Leiden under the well-known Dutch Asia scholar Leonard Blussé. Dr. Chiu made extensive use of the records of the Dutch East India Company, which had been compiled under Blussé’s leadership, and presents a fascinating and detailed account of the interactions between the Dutch and aborigines during the period 1624 through 1662.

Chiu first tries to present a picture of aboriginal life before the arrival of the Dutch, which is not easy as the aborigines did not have any written history, and account of encounters of Western visitors with the aborigines before 1600 were scarce. Still, she pulls together a narrative of isolated villages, often surrounded by a palisade for protection, scattered across the countryside.

These villages were generally small, several hundred inhabitants at most, without a central leadership among groups of villages, which were also often at war with each other: headhunting was a common practice.

Before the arrival of the Dutch, there were also few Chinese settlers. Dutch surveys in the beginning of their rule over Taiwan counted only a few hundred Fukienese fishermen and traders, scattered along the coast. This of course changed when the Dutch first attempted to press the aborigines into agriculture, which didn’t work as they were hunters and gatherers, who did not want to toil the soil.

The Dutch subsequently resorted to importing seasonal contract laborers from the Fukien coast, who usually came under two or three year contracts, without their families. However, these farmers often took local, aboriginal wives, and this population grew steadily, so that by 1650, the number of Chinese settlers had increased to some 15,000 against a total population of indigenous aborigines of nearly 200,000.
Chiu then describes the interaction between the Dutch and the villages immediately surrounding the Dutch establishment at Fort Zeelandia / Anping. These villages were mainly populated by the Siraya tribe, and Dutch records describe these encounters in great detail. The relation with some villages was peaceful, but others – in particular Mattauw and Soulang – remained hostile, leading to several military expeditions.

After some time, the broader region around the fort was peaceful, enabling the Fukienese settlers to increase their cultivation of rice and sugar, and leading to a prosperous interaction between Dutch, Fukienese and Siraya. Under this Pax Neerlandica, a system of governance was established under which the local chiefs, representing their respective villages, attended an annual Landdag and exchanged views with each other and the Dutch governor on local issues.

However, this system only extended to the area surrounding Zeelandia / Anping. When the Dutch attempted to include the offshore island of Lamey, the islanders – fiercely independent and very distrustful of their Sirayan neighbors – fought back, eventually leading to their relocation and dispersal among the Siraya. Chiu dedicates a whole chapter to this unfortunate episode.

After about a dozen years – in the mid 1630s – a number of reasons prompted an expansion in both Northern and Southern direction: towards the North in search of more Formosan
deer products, which were becoming extinct in the immediate surroundings of Zeelandia due to excessive hunting. This brought the Dutch to areas in what is now Central Taiwan, then called Favorlangh.

The expansion in southerly direction was prompted by search for gold, and brought the Dutch past what is now Kaohsiung to Pingtung, then called Lonckjouw, all the way around the southern tip of the island to present-day Taitung. This foothold later proved to be beneficial to a sizable group of some 60 Dutch who escaped Cheng Chen-kung’s (Koxinga) siege of Fort Zeelandia in 1661-1662, and who from there were able to return to Batavia in the Dutch East Indies.

In the very North of Taiwan, the situation was quite different: there the Spanish had established themselves in 1626 (two years after the Dutch settled in Zeelandia) and built two fortresses, one at Tamsuy and the other at Queylang (present-day Keelung).

Map of Formosa (partially in French) during the Dutch period (1624-1662)
The rivalry between the Dutch and Spanish was intense: not only a competition for trade, but also strong religious and political angles: the Dutch had turned Protestant the 1560s against the repression of Catholic Spain and were fighting for their independence from Spain in the 80 Years War (1568-1648).

The battles at Tamsuy and Quelang were thus only a very local component of an ongoing global strife. In 1642 the Dutch won this battle and expelled the Spanish. The irony was that the fact that the Catholic mission was located right next to the military compound helped the Dutch: they climbed the Church tower and fired down at the defenseless Spanish soldiers.

From these Northern strongholds, the Dutch explored the newly obtained territories, but the going was not easy: the populations were suspicious of the new intruders and often fought back. The Dutch also made several expeditions to what is now Ilan region, in search of gold, but the results were meager at best, and the territory remained largely unexplored until the Japanese period, many centuries later.

In the final chapters of the book, Chiu explores the triangular interactions between Dutch, Fukienese settlers and traders, and the aborigines in great detail. She focuses on both the administrative interactions, civil interaction (inter-ethnic marriage and indigenous citizenry) and economic interaction.

She concludes with a chapter on the religious interaction, starting from a description of aboriginal religious practices, and then describing how the Dutch attempted to convert the aborigines to Christianity, eventually succeeding in establishing several dozen churches in the area around Zeelandia, and converting some 5,000. In the North they faced a different dynamic, as the Spanish had worked for 20 years to convert the aborigines there to Catholicism.

Conclusion: an excellent and detailed scholarly work about the Dutch period in Taiwan, and the “civilizing process” that occurred in the interaction between the Dutch explorers, the native aborigines and the immigrant Fukien population that eventually overwhelmed the Formosan aborigines.

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