Rising tensions surrounding Senkakus

Three-way tug for island group

During the months of August and September 2012, the tensions surrounding the Senkaku/Tiaoyutai increased significantly. As we described in the previous issue of *Taiwan Communiqué* (*New tensions surrounding the Senkakus*, no. 137, pp 10-11) the recent flare up started in mid-August when a group of Chinese activists from Hong Kong sailed their fishing boat to the islands, landed, and planted Chinese and ROC flags there, only to be arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard. This episode prompted large-scale anti-Japanese demonstration in China.

The next wave of tension occurred in mid September, after the central government in Japan announced its decision to purchase three small islands in the Senkaku archipel from its private owners in order to forestall the governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, from purchasing the islands in order to push his nationalistic claims.
The move prompted sharp protests from the government in Beijing and large-scale demonstrations across China, but also angry rebukes from the Ma government in Taipei. Below we briefly summarize the main issues and developments.

**Japan-bashing flares up in China**

In many Chinese cities fiery anti-Japanese demonstrations erupted, with large crowds ransacking Japanese businesses and throwing stones and eggs at the Japanese embassy in Beijing. Major newspapers such as the Washington Post reported that these demonstrations were encouraged by the authorities.

In mid-September 2012 the situation deteriorated even further when a large fleet of Chinese fishing boats sailed to the islands, and Chinese coastal patrol boats started to make incursions into Japanese territorial waters, leading to tense standoffs.

The conflict also reached the hallowed halls of the United Nations, where the Chinese and Japanese envoys had sharp exchanges on September 25th and 27th, with the Japanese side insisting that the islands were *terra nullius* before 1895, and that Japan legally incorporated them at that time. The Chinese accused Japan of “stealing” the islands, and told Japan to “stop all activities that violate China’s territorial sovereignty.” Japanese Prime Minister Yashihika Noda stated in response: “So far as the Senkaku islands are concerned, they are the inherent part of our territory, in light of history and international law. It’s very clear.”

In the meantime, the United States tried to cool the situation by leaning on all sides to refrain from provocative moves, and prevent situations where miscalculation could lead to a conflict. Officially the US has stated that it does not take a position on the sovereignty over the islands, but has emphasized time and again that it does consider them part of territory controlled by Japan, and therefore falling under the US Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan.

However, the Chinese continued to send patrol boats into the area surrounding the islands. These ships have sailed mainly in the “contiguous zone”, an area just outside of the territorial waters, but have entered the territorial waters a total of eight times this year, as compared to only once in 2011. In early October 2012 it was also reported in the press that the Chinese were planning to send up Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to patrol the area.
Mixed signals from Taiwan

During this period, the Ma government in Taipei sent a number of mixed signals. On the one hand, on August 5th 2012, it proposed a East China Sea Peace Initiative, which was later elaborated during a symbolic visit of President Ma Ing-jeou on September 7th 2012 to the Pengjia Islet, some 55 km North of Taiwan and 140 km to the West of the disputed Senkaku island group.

However, in mid-September the Ma administration added oil to the fire by first angrily recalling its (unofficial) representative from Tokyo, and then by allowing a fleet of some 40-50 fishing boats to sail to the islands, and sending about a dozen Taiwan Coast Guard vessels along to “protect” the fishermen. On September 25th 2012, the Taiwan ships got into a water cannon fight with Japanese vessels in a skirmish that could easily have gotten out of hand, as the ships were maneuvering at close quarters and could have resulted in a collision.

To outside observers, it was also disconcerting that on a number of occasions the Ma government in Taipei took the same side as the PRC regime in Beijing, prompting many to ask the question: which side is the Ma government on? (See OpEd below). Reports in the press in Taiwan also indicated that the fishermen had received a considerable amount of money – ostensibly to cover fuel costs – from Mr. Tsai Eng-meng, the notoriously pro-China publisher of the Want Want / China Times Group (see article on page 10).

The water cannon episode also ruffled feathers on the American side, prompting US officials to express their displeasure with the stance of the Ma administration by not sending any high-level officials to the annual US-Taiwan Business Council meeting, which this year took place in Hershey, Pennsylvania from September 30th to October 2nd 2012. The US later stated that the absence was due to “scheduling conflicts”, but the signal was clear.
The US pressure prompted the government in Taipei to take a less confrontational course: in early October 2012 it was announced that by the end of the year fisheries negotiations between Taipei and Tokyo would be resumed. Under the previous DPP administration of President Chen Shui-bian, a series of fisheries negotiations had been held, but these were stopped in 2009 after President Ma came to power.

The war of ads

The developments surrounding the islands also led to a war of ads in major American newspapers: on 28 September 2012, the ChinaDaily put a two-page centerfold ad in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal and Los Angeles Times. The ad featured a large picture of one of the islands, and had a large headline, blaring “Diaoyu Islands Belong to China.”

The ad continued by giving arguments that the islands had been “an inherent territory of China since ancient times”, that they were “stolen from China”, that according to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations they should have been returned to China, that the transfer to Japan by the United States was a “backroom deal”, and closing with a statement that China would “defend (its) national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Interestingly, the ad stated that the islands had been “under China’s jurisdiction in the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties.” The fact is of course that during a significant period in the Ming and Qing dynasties, Taiwan and surrounding islands were under the control of the Dutch East India Company (1624-1662), with no representative from either Ming or Qing emperors in sight.

The ad also contained an interesting map of the area, with Taiwan depicted as “Taiwan Island”, and given the same color as China, implying it was part of China.

Not to be outdone, on 10 October 2012 the Kuomintang government in Taipei placed an ad in the same newspapers, titled “The East China Sea Initiative.” According to the Taipei Times the ad was “…heavy, dense and filled with hard-to-read type.” It contained a detailed 10-point claim to Taiwan sovereignty over the islands, and ended with an appeal to the US government and people to support Ma’s peace initiative. The Taipei Times quoted sources as saying that the three-color ads cost about US$175,000 in the Wall Street Journal; US$150,000 in the New York Times; US$100,000 in the Washington Post and US$75,000 in the Los Angeles Times.

Interestingly, the rug of “ROC (Taiwan) sovereignty” over the islands was pulled out from under the Taipei government by an article titled “The Diaoyutai Islands on Taiwan’s
Official Maps: Pre- and Post-1971.” The article by three scholars from Academia Sinica in Taipei showed that based on cartographic evidence, the ROC government of Chiang Kai-shek didn’t start claiming sovereignty over the Diaoyutai until 1971. On all official ROC maps before that period, the islands were shown as belonging to Japan. The article was published in *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39:90-105, 2012, by Routledge.

The way forward in the Senkaku altercation

By Mei-chin Chen, a Washington-based commentator. This article first appeared in the *Taipei Times* on 2 October 2012. Reprinted with permission.

As the dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands — known as the Senkakus to Japan — between Japan and China leads to worsening tensions in the region, an important question is: Which side is Taiwan on?

On the one hand, we have seen President Ma Ying-jeou’s East China Sea peace initiative, which was proposed on Aug. 5, and reiterated during his visit to Pengjia Islet on September 7. The initiative calls for “peaceful dialogue and mutually reciprocal negotiations,” and for “sharing resources and cooperative development.”

However, on the other hand, we have seen actions from Taiwan’s side that contribute to mounting tensions: Allowing a fleet of more than 40 fishing boats to sail to the Diaoyutais to strengthen Taipei’s “sovereignty” claim, while sending along a dozen coast guard vessels to “protect” them is simply unhelpful and only contributes to an increase in tensions.

Such moves certainly do not help the fishermen gain further fishing rights. One could even argue that because of these confrontational moves, the Japanese are less likely to grant additional fishing rights around the islands to fishing boats from Taiwan.
In any case, Taiwanese fishermen already have the right to fish outside the 12 mile coastal zone under an agreement reached between Japan and the previous Democratic Progressive Party administration.

However, an even more important issue is the perception of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government siding with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the issue of the island group.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued statement after statement and Ma himself condemning Japan for its purchase of three of the islets from a private Japanese owner, although it was clear that the motivation of the Japanese government was to calm things down by preventing the nationalist governor of Tokyo from purchasing the islands.

The past week has also seen a significant increase in the number of statements from the Chinese praising the Ma government for its actions. The PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office chirped: “The two sides of the [Taiwan] Strait are one family. Brothers, even if they argue at home, should stand united against aggression from outside.”

On Friday, the PRC went so far as to place a huge advertisement in both the Washington Post and the New York Times titled “Diaoyu islands belong to China.” The advertisement included a map conveniently portraying “Taiwan Island” as part of China. We have seen nary a word of protest from Taipei on this attack on its sovereignty.

So the question becomes very much: Which side is the Ma administration on? Is it siding with China and increasingly letting Taiwan drift into the grasp of an undemocratic and authoritarian regime in Beijing? Or does it want to come down on the right side of history?

As a member of the Taiwanese-American community, I would like to see Taiwan come down on the side of those countries that adhere to the same basic principles and values that are dear to us in this country: freedom and democracy.

Japan is a major power in the region that is free and democratic. It did not provoke the present conflict. It is clear that China did by whipping up nationalistic sentiments against Japan and its citizens. Taiwan and its government would do well to keep a safe distance from China and maintain good relations with its democratic neighbors.
What policies for the second term?

In our *Taiwan Communiqué* no. 136 we wrote about the confusing statements in President Ma’s May 20th inaugural address, as well as the fallacy of the “One ROC, two areas” concept advocated by Mr. Ma as basis for his future dealings and relations with China (see “Ma Ying-jeou drifting off to China”, *Communiqué* no. 136, pp. 1-5).

Now we are a few months down the road, and have a few more indications of the direction his administration is taking. This is reflected in the appointments he made as well as a number of positions and decisions taken by his administration. An overview:

**Reshuffle: Old wine in new bottles**

On September 19th 2012, the Ma government announcement a significant Cabinet reshuffle, mainly focusing on the foreign policy and cross-Strait areas. Below is a brief summary, interlaced with some comments.

Mainland Affairs Council Chairperson Ms. Lai Shih-yuan will step down and move to Geneva as the representative to the World Trade Organization. She will be succeeded as MAC Chairperson by Mr. Wang Yuh-chi, who until now served as National Security Council advisor. Ms. Lai was often at odds with the Ma administration, which left her to defend indefensible positions on cross-Strait issues. She will be happier in Geneva.

The choice of her successor, Mr. Wang Yu-chi, raised many eyebrows in Taipei. He is young and inexperienced, never having had any position of responsibility within the government. His main claim to fame is that he is a close confidant of Mr. Ma and is generally considered a “yes-man.”
Mr. Wang’s lack of knowledge on China issues became quite apparent on 2 October 2012, when during an interpellation in the Legislative Yuan he could only identify two out of nine members of the Central Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. During another session he also failed to recognize the famed Chinese dissident Ai Weiwei, the designer of the “Bird’s Nest Stadium”, who was imprisoned by the PRC in April 2011, and is now kept under house arrest.

Strait Exchange Foundation Chairman Chiang Ping-kun will step down, and be replaced by Mr. Lin Chung-sheng, presently secretary-general of the Kuomintang party. The departure of Mr. Chiang comes as no surprise: he had increasingly been accused of a conflict of interests, as he and his family have considerable business dealings in China. His successor, Mr. Lin Chung-sheng, also has little experience in cross-Strait affairs, and was primarily chosen because he belongs to Ma’s inner circle.

Foreign Minister Timothy Yang will move to the position of secretary-general of the presidential office, and be succeeded by Mr. “David” Lin Yung-le, who is now Taiwan’s representative in Brussels. As foreign minister, Yang was seen as a relative lightweight. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Lin, who is a professional diplomat, will be able to do better, and put his mark on foreign policy in any way.

Taiwan’s present representative in Washington, Mr. Jason Yuan, will move back to Taiwan to become secretary-general of the National Security Council, replacing Mr. Hu Wei-chen, who is becoming a senior advisor to the president.

Mr. Yuan’s term in Washington was contentious: he closely toed the party line of the Ma administration, but was at odds with the Taiwanese-American community in the States. He never reached out to them and also was never invited to any of their events. Under previous administrations, representatives like Jason Hu, C.J. Chen, and David Lee always made it a point to be on speaking terms with the community. This did not happen at all under Mr. Yuan.

Mr. Yuan will be succeeded by Mr. King Pu-tsung, a close confidant of Mr. Ma. His move to Washington is being questioned by many observers, as he is a long-time party operative with little diplomatic or international experience. He was Mr. Ma’s campaign manager during 2012 presidential election campaign, and is generally considered the instigator of many of the dirty tricks against DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen.

Also, when Mr. King was appointed KMT secretary-general in 2009, the top US official in Taiwan described Mr. King in a cable to Washington as reminiscent of the "dapper gangsters frequently seen in Hong Kong films."
A more general comment frequently heard in Taiwan was that this reshuffle brings little “new blood” into Mr. Ma’s policymaking circles. The main positions are taken by a few close confidants, who have shown little inclination to have a mind of their own, but more often than not simply toed the party line.

A second often heard comment was that Mr. Ma is reshuffling the Cabinet in the wrong place: there are major problems in the economic area, but no changes in personnel there. The foreign affairs / cross-Strait area is – at least from the perspective of the Ma administration – going well, so why make so many changes there?

Taiwan Communiqué comment: A particular problem with the appointments made by the Ma administration to Washington is that the representatives sent to Washington have been diehard party operatives with a narrow focus on enhancing Kuomintang interests in Washington. None of the persons presented themselves as representing a broader political spectrum in Taiwan, let alone Taiwan as a nation.

This tendency to focus on party interests is a holdover from the old days of Martial Law, when the interests of ROC government were indeed one and the same as those of the KMT party. However, under the governments of presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, representatives such as C.J. Chen and David Lee gradually moved to present themselves as representing everyone in Taiwan, irrespective of political affiliation. The present and proposed new representatives regrettably reflect a step back to the bad old days.

Overseas Affairs Commission covertly re-sinicized

At the end of September 2012 it became known in Taiwan that the Ma administration had covertly re-sinicized the name of the Overseas Compatriots’ Affairs Commission. During the Martial Law period until 1987 the organization was known as Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and was an important tool of political control of the overseas community by the repressive Kuomintang regime.

However, during the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian administrations, it was gradually modified into an organization for cultural, educational, economic and informational exchanges between Taiwan and overseas Taiwanese communities, and in 2006, the name was changed into the more neutral Overseas Compatriots’ Affairs Commission.
On 26 September 2012, in a meeting of the legislature’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, DPP legislators questioned OCAC Chairman Wu Ying-yih on the move, and he admitted that the change had been made effective 01 September 2012. The legislators strongly criticized the change, saying it made the agency look like an arm of the PRC government.

The name change also came under strong criticism of overseas Taiwanese organizations, who wrote a joint letter to President Ma on 04 October 2012, objecting both to the use of the term “Chinese” for an organization that is supposed to maintain contacts with the overseas Taiwanese community, and to the secretive way the decision had been arrived at, without any consultation with overseas Taiwanese groups. A few quotes from the letter:

*We consider ourselves Taiwanese, and we are proud of our identity and heritage. The term “Chinese” is confusing, as it gives outsiders the impression that this is an organization under the control of the People’s Republic of China and its Communist government. …..*

*Regrettably, this episode is but the most recent incident pointing to the erosion of democratic governance in Taiwan under the Ma government since 2008. Time and again, we see that this administration undermines the foundations of a young democracy that was established only 20 years ago through the sacrifice and unwavering determination of the people in Taiwan, together with us in the overseas Taiwanese community.*

*We urge the Taiwan authorities to retain the present title of the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Council, or even move forward and rename the agency as the Overseas Taiwanese Affairs Council, to more fully represent the spirit of a free and democratic Taiwan.*

The letter was signed by 31 Taiwanese-American organizations from across the United States plus the Greater Vancouver Taiwanese Canadian Association.

**Protests against Want Want takeover of cable TV network**

During August and September 2012, there was an increasing chorus of protests against the proposed takeover of the Chinese Network Systems (CNS) by the Want Want/China
Times group, already one of the largest news media conglomerates in Taiwan. The takeover was conditionally approved by the National Communications Commission under the Ma government on 25 July 2012.

Owner of the Want Want / China Times media group is a Mr. Tsai Eng-meng, who became well known in the West when he made some outrageous statements in an interview with the Washington Post in January 2012. In the interview, Tsai was quoted as saying that reports of the massacre at Tienanmen Square in Beijing in 1989 were “not true.”

Tsai reportedly already controls three Taiwan newspapers, a TV station, various magazines, and a cable network. According to the Washington Post, the media he controls have veered sharply toward a more pro-China line. Tsai also used his money and publications to influence the outcome of the January 2012 elections (Washington Post, “Tycoon prods Taiwan closer to China”, 21 January 2012).

The proposed takeover of the CNS network prompted a number of media groups and civil liberties organizations to organize a large-scale protest in Taipei on 1 September 2012, which is Journalism Day in Taiwan. Some 6,000 journalists, students, academics and social activists marched from the offices of Want Want / China Times to the National Communications Commission.

The main theme of the demonstration was monopolization of the media, with many observers and participants fearing that Tsai Eng-meng will further stifle freedom of expression in Taiwan. He is known to have fired editors and reporters on the spot for reporting or writing articles that were critical of personalities or developments in China.

In spite of the 1 September 2012 protest and of interpellations and protests in the Legislative Yuan, the NCC’s chairperson, Mr. Howard Shyr, stated at the end of September that his organization would not annul the deal since “the case was closed because it was approved with independent and professional consideration.”
Taiwan Communiqué comment: Both the OCAC name change and the approval of the Want Want takeover of the cable network are strong indications that the Ma government is steering Taiwan to even closer ties with China at the expense of democracy and freedom of expression in Taiwan. Together with the appointment of a number of strongly pro-unification people to key positions in his government, this is a worrying trend as it appears he wants to put Taiwan for an irreversible fait accompli.

This “blind rapprochement” is occurring despite strong indicators that China is on a collision course with the West and with Taiwan’s democratic allies in the region. The developments surrounding the Senkakus and the South China Sea have shown that China is bent on expansion and confrontation with its neighbors in the region. The question is increasingly being asked: Which side is the Taiwan of Mr. Ma on?

Ma popularity sinks to new lows

Interestingly, the new moves by the Ma administration have led to a further deterioration of his popularity: in two opinion polls published at the end of September and the beginning of October 2012, Ma’s popularity rating dropped to their lowest ever:

In a poll released on 27 September 2012 by the highly respected Taiwan Indicator Research Survey (TISR), President Ma’s support level dropped to 16.7%, while the level of trust in him and his government went down to 23.6%. The disapproval rating rose to the highest ever (71.7%), while the distrust topped out at 58.1%.

On the next day, the TVBS poll, which is generally considered blue-leaning (pro-government), published its own poll results which were even worse for the President: it showed a satisfaction level of 13%, the worst since his mishandling of the aftermath
of Typhoon Morakot in the Summer of 2009. The TVBS showed a dissatisfaction level of 69%. It also showed high levels of dissatisfaction among traditionally Kuomintang voters: only 30% in this category approved of Ma’s performance, while 49% were dissatisfied.

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Taiwan mural in Oregon

Corvallis mayor stand up to Chinese pressure

By Ambassador Nat Bellocchi. Mr. Bellocchi served as Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan from 1990 through 1995. The views expressed in this article are his own.

The Chinese have a habit of shooting themselves in the foot. This expression is a nice American idiom dating back from the days of cowboys and Indians, when an inexperienced gunslinger could damage his own position and reputation by firing his gun in the wrong direction.

This is what happened this time around when the PRC consulate-general in San Francisco got itself worked up about a mural that had gone up on the small college town of Corvallis, Oregon, the home of Oregon State University.

The mural had been commissioned by a longtime Corvallis resident, Mr. David Lin, who wanted to express his support for freedom, democracy and independence in Tibet and Taiwan. The 10x100 ft mural was painted by artists Chao Tsung-song from Taiwan and Lucy Lu from Vancouver BC in August 2012, and depicted scenes from Tibet and Taiwan.
So far so good. But before the mural was even finished, the PRC consulate-general in San Francisco fired off a letter to Corvallis mayor Julie Manning, urging her to “…adopt effective measures to stop activities advocating Tibet Independence and Taiwan Independence in Corvallis” implying the relations and economic ties between Oregon and the PRC would suffer if the mural was not taken down.

This ham-fisted approach met with a rebuff from mayor Manning, who politely but firmly informed the consulate-general that the US has a Constitution with a First Amendment that guarantees people in this country freedom of speech, which includes freedom of artistic expression.

Not satisfied with this response, the consulate-general sent two of its diplomats to Corvallis to try to convince the city government to take down the mural, but to no avail. To her credit, Mayor Julie Manning stood by her decision and made it clear that the mural was here to stay as long as property owner David Lin wanted to keep it there.

On September 8th 2012, the Corvallis Gazette reported on the Chinese efforts to suppress freedom of speech in this country, and this was the shot that was heard around the world. Soon, mayor Manning started to receive messages of support for standing up to Chinese bullying, and the newspaper received dozens of emails congratulating it on its reporting on the matter.

In early September 2012, the Oregon Congressional delegation got wind of the issue, and weighed in: Congressman Peter DeFazio blasted China for its interference in internal US affairs on the House floor, and on 13 September 2012 Oregon Senator Ron Wyden sent a strongly worded letter to the Chinese ambassador in Washington, expressing his deep displeasure at the actions of the consulate-general.

He highlighted the rights of freedom of religion, of the press, and the right of people to peacefully assemble, as enshrined in the US Constitution. He then warned the ambassador that “While these rights might not be respected in China, they are values that all Americans hold dear. Any attempt by your government to suppress these rights is unacceptable and must not be repeated.”
What does all of this mean for Taiwan? It is a good example of the fact that Americans are willing to stand up for Taiwan and its democracy. But that requires that the Taiwanese themselves stand up and speak up for their rights too. It requires that the Taiwanese people speak out on issues such as press freedom, freedom of assembly, and a fair and impartial judiciary.

The Corvallis mural became an important symbol for freedom of speech because people like David Lin stood up for what he believes in, and the mayor of Corvallis had the right response when she reminded the Chinese that the US has some basic principles and values for which it stands. Perhaps both Washington and Taipei can learn something from Corvallis.

Former President Chen’s health deteriorating

In the previous issue of Taiwan Communiqué we reported on former President Chen’s deteriorating health, and about the visit by three US medical specialists who raised alarm about his mental health. In mid-July 2012, the specialists issued a report which was presented to the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission in the US Congress.

Since that time the physical and mental health condition of the former President have seriously deteriorated. He was hospitalized again on September 12th 2012. At the Taoyuan General Hospital they treated him for prostate problems, but also discovered a blood clot in his right frontal lobe, indicating he had suffered a minor stroke. The former President also developed speech problems.

The Taoyuan General Hospital announced in a press conference on 17 September 2012 that it did not have adequate facilities to treat
the former President and recommended that he be transferred to a major medical center. Two physicians in Taipei, **Dr. Chang Yeh-shen** and Taipei Veterans General Hospital physician **Dr. Kuo Cheng-deng** added that the former President had experienced a number of complications during the past four years, including breathing difficulties, ulcers and coronary problems, but never received appropriate care in prison.

After a tug-of-war on the choice of hospitals, the former President was transferred to Taipei Veterans General Hospital (TVGH) on 21 September 2012. He and his family had indicated that they wanted him to be transferred to Mackay Memorial Hospital in Taipei or a hospital in Kaohsiung, close to his family, but the prison authorities denied the request, saying that the other hospitals didn’t have the proper equipment to treat the former President. The other hospitals later denied that they had ever been contacted by the prison authorities about the available equipment.

After a few days at TVGH, the hospital announced that the former President was suffering from “*a severe depression and anxiety disorder, both of which have become chronic,*” indicating that adequate treatment could take from nine months to two years. It recommended that Chen be transferred to another hospital with a specialized department for further treatment.

In response, DPP lawmakers again appealed to President Ma to grant a medical parole. In a joint statement issued on 5 October 2012 they said: “*President Ma has come to a critical juncture to make the decision. It is an eminent problem that both the governing and opposition parties have to deal with, because Chen Shui-bian is in a critical health condition.*”

“The decision Ma makes would determine whether Chen can carry on living. We urge Ma to give Taiwan a chance and Chen an opportunity to live. At this juncture in history, Ma could make a decision that can reflect concerns related to medical humanitarianism, the dignity of a former head of state, social harmony, and the possibility of ending the political division in the country.”

**Foreign delegation pleads for medical parole**

During his time at Taoyuan General Hospital, President Chen was also visited by a foreign delegation made up of human rights activists Hans Wahl, based in Paris, and Harreld Dinkins, who is based in Washington DC. The visit was organized by Washington-based Jack Healey, who heads the Human Rights Action Center in DC. Mr. Healey himself could not come because of a health problem.
The delegation did meet with Chen at the hospital on 17 September 2012, and said they were shocked by the physical and mental state of the former President. They said he suffered from slurred speech, and displayed an unusual level of fatigue during the 20-minute exchange. The next day, the two relayed their concerns to Justice Minister Tseng Yung-fu. The two said that the conditions under which the former President had been held in prison were “grim”, and added that his medical condition was “grave and worsening.”

A few days earlier, the former President had also been visited by several prominent DPP members, including DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang and former DPP Chair Dr. Tsai Ing-wen. All said they were deeply disturbed by the former President’s physical and mental health condition, and called for medical parole so he can receive adequate treatment for his multiple medical problems.

During this period, a prominent physician from National Taiwan University Hospital, Dr. Ko Wen-je, also stated that without adequate medical treatment the former President would develop dementia “within six months.” The doctor strongly criticized the Justice Ministry for “placing political concerns above medical expertise.”

During the past two months more than half of the city and county councils in Taiwan have adopted resolutions calling for medical parole for the former President. Interestingly, they were joined by Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin, who himself is a prominent Kuomintang member and a potential candidate to run for President in 2016. He stated on 21 August 2012: “Former president Chen’s medical parole is not a simple judicial issue, but also a social issue ...Granting him a medical parole would be a highly significant move that would heal the scars in our society and bring social and political reconciliation.”
Report from Washington

**Congressman Andrews (D-NJ) proposes Center for Taiwan Security Analysis**


Rep. Andrews wrote to Marshall that: “Even though Taiwan is a sovereign independent country today, its citizens live in the shadow of over 1,600 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles aimed by the PRC. The PRC still refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, continues to claim Taiwan as a renegade province, and in 2005 passed an ‘Anti-Secession Law’ mandating military action if Taiwan moves toward formal de jure independence.”

The letter continued: “In light of the growing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait and the continuing threat posed by the PRC, it is imperative that the United States seeks ways to reduce the probability of armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, which remains a major global flashpoint.”

Andrews concluded: “As you assume your new position at the helm of the USIP, I encourage you to establishment of a “Center for Taiwan Security Analysis” within the Institute with the goal of conducting in-depth analysis on the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship from a conflict-prevention lens.”

FAPA President Mark Kao commented on the letter, saying: “The USIP is world-renowned for its work to prevent or end violent conflict around the world, and there are few places where its insights and analyses are needed more than in the Taiwan Strait.”

Dr. Kao added: “As recent events in East Asia have underscored the fragility of peace and stability in the waters surrounding Taiwan, it becomes clear that the protection of U.S. interests requires a better understanding of the complex sources of potential conflict in the Asian Pacific region.”
**Congressman Garrett (R-NJ) calls for Taiwan inclusion in the UN**

On September 20th 2012, US Congressman Scott Garrett (R-NJ) issued the following statement, calling for Taiwan’s inclusion in the United Nations:

On September 18, 2012, as representatives of countries from all around the world gathered in New York City to open the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly, one democratic and peace-loving nation—Taiwan—was once again shut out from the proceedings.

Taiwan’s economy is among the largest and most developed in the world, and it has been hailed as a stable and democratic role model for the rest of Asia. Yet its population of 23 million people has virtually no representation in the UN or its affiliated organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Association, the International Maritime Organization, and the World Health Organization (WHO). Without membership in the WHO, Taiwan is excluded from the global epidemic surveillance network, putting both the Taiwanese people and the global community at risk.

Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations is solely due to the diplomatic obstruction of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which continues to use the threat of military force to assert its territorial claims over Taiwan. The PRC refuses to forswear the use of force to settle the dispute between its government and that of Taiwan. Furthermore, since assuming its seat in the United Nations in 1971, the PRC has wielded its growing economic and geopolitical influence around the globe to severely limit Taiwan’s international space and isolate it from the global community.

To help remedy this unjust situation, the United States must continue to stand with the Taiwanese people and help lead Taiwan back fully into the global system. The goals of equality and inclusion embodied by the Charter of the United Nations will remain unfulfilled until the free and democratic people of Taiwan are fully represented in the international community.
Book Review
Lost Colony: *The untold story of China’s first great victory over the West*

*by Tonio Andrade, reviewed by Gerrit van der Wees*

Andrade is a well-known and respected figure in the small world of Taiwan history experts. His earlier work, *How Taiwan became Chinese*, was well researched and documented, although we disagreed with his overall thesis (see our review in *Taiwan Communiqué* no. 128, June/July 2010).

History repeats itself with this new book. It is extremely well written – and could easily pass for an exciting historical novel. Andrade spins a gripping tale, full of excellent anecdotes and insights, but then goes off on a tangent when drawing his conclusions.

His main theme is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Ming follower Cheng Ch’eng-kung, known as Koxinga in the West, was able to defeat the Dutch settlement of Fort Zeelandia (present-day Tainan) in 1661-1662 due to a relative equal level of gun technology (both big guns and smaller handguns) and superior military tactics and strategy.

He does explain how the Dutch still had the advantage in terms of having a highly defensible fortress (rennaissance fort technology) and the ability of their ships, loaded with heavy guns, to maneuver fast in deep water, with sail rigging that enabled them to sail into the wind.

However, these advantages were, in Andrade’s view, not sufficient to make a difference in the conflict, particularly due to some basic errors made by the Dutch commander of the fort, Frederick Coyet. In particular Coyet had not taken advantage of opportunities to build bridges and alliances, both within the Dutch East India Company and with the Manchu / Ch’ing rulers who had gained power in China after 1644.

Coyet was actually a Swedish nobleman in Dutch service. He was a proud and principled man, and had his differences with officials in Batavia, as well as with key commanders of the fleet that was sent to break Koxinga’s blockade, which lasted from April 1661 to February 1662.
After the “loss of Taiwan”, Coyet returned to Batavia, but was tried for treason, almost executed (described in detail by Andrade in the very first chapter), but then banned to a far-away island. After ten years he was released, returned to the Netherlands, and wrote a stinging rebuke of his superiors in Batavia, titled “’t Verwaerloosde Formosa” (The Neglected Formosa), which became a best-seller.

According to Andrade, Koxinga was able to incorporate new ideas and technologies. He was the son of Chinese pirate father, Cheng Chi-long, and a Japanese mother, named Tagawa. He was born in Nagasaki in 1624, and in his early youth spent some years in Japan, but at age seven his father moved him to China where he continued his schooling and eventually studied in Nanking. When the Ch’ing dynasty took over in 1644, his father surrendered, but the son continued resistance along the coast.

In 1658–1659 he assembled a large fleet, sailed to the North, and tried to recapture Nanking, but was beaten back by Ch’ing Dynasty forces (and by a typhoon which wrecked many boats and drowned many of his men). During the following year, he was under increasing pressure from Ch’ing forces, which pursued him down the coast. Eventually, in early 1661, he decided to make a big move, assembled some 400 boats and 25,000 men and crossed the Taiwan Strait to lay siege to the Dutch settlement at Anping (present-day Tainan).
Because of information gleaned from a defector named He Bin (a translator who had provided him with maps of the fortress) Koxinga was able enter the bay behind the fortress through a narrow channel and land his fleet outside the reach of the big Dutch cannons in the fortress. He attacked and took a smaller Fort Provintia and thus cut off supplies both on the land and seaside. This started a siege which would last nine months.

Miraculously, the Dutch were able to send word of the siege to Batavia. In one of the major daring feats of the episode, a small yacht name Maria under captain Cornelius Clawson was able to sail against the prevailing Monsoon winds and make it to the VOC headquarters in seven weeks. A relief fleet under commander Jacob Cauw was sent and had a speedy journey back to Taiwan, but the counterattack against Koxinga failed, partially due to a typhoon and partially due to disagreements between Cauw and Coyet.

As the siege continued, supplies in the fort began to run out, while Koxinga was also aided by another defector, Hans Radis, a German sergeant who had been in Dutch service and who loved rice wine, which Koxinga gave him plenty of. Radis gave Koxinga inside information on the defense of the fortress.

The situation eventually prompted negotiations in which Coyet was able to ensure free passage for himself and other Dutch at the fortress. In total some 630 Dutch and 9,000 Chinese combatants had been killed, in addition to several thousand aborigines, fighting on the side of the Dutch. In addition, Koxinga killed several hundred Dutch missionaries and teachers in surrounding villages.

However, the fall of Zeelandia was not the end of the story. Andrade describes in detail how during the period 1662-1668, the fighting continued across a broad front: in 1663 Dutch admiral Balthasar Bort with only 15 ships coordinated with a Ching Dynasty fleet in an attack against the remaining Koxinga forces in Jinmen, and defeated them. In 1666, the Dutch had built up a fortress in the northern port city of Jilong (present-day Keelung),
and with only 300 defenders fended off an attack by some 40 junks and 3000 Koxinga troops. Koxinga himself had of course died in 1663, but his successors held out until 1683, when they were defeated in the Battle of Penghu by Ch’ing admiral Shih Lang.

And now for the conclusions. Contrary to Andrade’s thesis, while technology, strategy and tactics, the appropriate alliances, and even the weather can make a difference, two other factors did make a more significant difference in the outcome of the conflict around Zeelandia: distance and overwhelming force. Taiwan was a long way away from Batavia (several weeks of sailing) while very close to the Chinese coast. Koxinga could thus bring in large numbers of troops, reinforcements and ships within a short period of time, while the Dutch had to travel large distances.

Another incorrect conclusion by Andrade is to call this a victory by “China” over the West. At that point, 1661-1662, Koxinga was not representing China at all, but his own personal fiefdom along the Coast. He kept the Ming Dynasty dream alive in order to keep a following among the adherents of the defeated dynasty. He was a renegade on the run from Beijing. In fact, the Ch’ing rulers were trying very hard to eradicate his strongholds along the coast, and that is why he took refuge across the Strait, trying to get away from China.

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