Unequal Treatment For Taiwan
Washington, November 13, 1998
The recent simultaneous negotiations on opposite sides of the
globe between Israel and the PLO on one hand, and Taiwan and
mainland China on the other demonstrate a major inconsistency
in American diplomacy. Because neither encounter resulted in
new or definitive agreements, we can expect the inconsistency
to persist for some time, to the discredit both of our
diplomacy and credibility.
In the Israeli-PLO meeting, the president was deeply
involved personally. Even before the Wye Plantation
conference, he routinely met with PLO leader Yasser Arafat,
including at the White House, and Hillary Clinton went so far
as to declare her support for a Palestinian state.
In Asia, by contrast, Taiwan negotiates with the People's
Republic of China unaided by any American presence or
assistance. Lee Teng-hui, the democratically elected leader of
Taiwan, is only rarely even permitted to enter the United
States, and he cannot be received at the State Department, let
alone the White House. It is the democratic government on
Taiwan that endures the bulk of American pressure to
accommodate its interlocutor, just as democratic Israel
receives the bulk of the pressure in the Middle East context.
The president's disparate treatments of the PLO and Taiwan
are difficult to compare, of course, given their widely
different circumstances. But there is one place where the
hypocrisies and inconsistencies of the administration's
policies become apparent with particular force: the United
Nations. The PLO, curiously known for 10 years in U.N. circles
as "Palestine," engages in U.N. affairs almost as a
full participant, with higher status than any other observer
organization, and just below that of member states. By
contrast, Taiwan will be completely on the outside, waging a
campaign for U.N. representation that the administration
scorns.
The U.N. Charter limits U.N. membership to "states,"
which are generally taken to be entities which control defined
territories, have ascertainable populations and capital
cities, and which exercise the normal functions of government
in domestic and international affairs. By this standard, any
reasonable person would have to concede that Taiwan - a
democracy with a population larger than two-thirds of the
U.N.'s present members, and one of the world's largest
international traders - meets the Charter definition of "statehood."
By contrast, the PLO is largely playing at statehood, hoping
through diplomatic charades to create "facts on the
ground" in New York that will help make its status in the
occupied territories look more serious. That the PLO is
nonetheless a more consequential player in the United Nations
than Taiwan speaks volumes. The palpable unfairness of denying
U.N. representation to Taiwan reflects not only the petulant
opposition of the Peoples Republic of China, but also the
organization's detachment from international reality.
Equally detached from reality was the PLO's recent success
in enhancing its status above that of other observer
organizations. Both outcomes reflect the underlying Third
World mentality that persists in the General Assembly. But
even more important is what these outcomes say about current
American foreign policy. Not only has the United States not
supported Taiwan's legitimate efforts to secure U.N.
representation, President Clinton, on his recent trip to the
Mainland, wholly subscribed to Beijing's opposition to such
representation.
By publicly agreeing to the PRC's position, the United
States has signaled to every other U.N. member that they too
should oppose Taiwan's efforts. Before the president's China
trip, U.S. opposition was at least unstated, leaving it to
Taipei and its friends to see what they could accomplish
diplomatically. By stepping in unnecessarily and gratuitously
in support of Beijing, the administration has enormously
complicated Taiwan's task.
The administration's inability - or, more likely,
unwillingness - to prevent the PLO's recent maneuver to gain
enhanced observer status in the U.N. represents either policy
error or incompetence. Although stating publicly that it
opposed the PLO's effort, the administration failed to prevent
it in a General Assembly vote. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright's all-purpose explanation was that U.N. members were
reflecting their displeasure with Israel's recalcitrance in
the peace process, rather than rejecting our views. Some
subordinates at the State Department may accept this
explanation, but it cannot hide what was, in fact, a flaccid
diplomatic performance by the United States.
Clinton administration policy on both the PLO and Taiwan
reflect common failings in the president's approach to world
affairs. First, the Administration has a hard time defining
what is actually in America's best interests, which accounts
for why its friend and allies are so often ill-treated. Since
neither Taiwan nor Israel is likely to fare any better at the
hands of any other international power, they have no choice
but to accept the administration's approach.
Yet, both Taiwan and Israel are free and thriving, in sharp
contrast to their neighbors, reflecting the kind of economic
and political maturation the United States should welcome and
encourage internationally. Nonetheless, others around the
world will note that President Clinton is careless with
countries that get too close.
Second, the administration defers to the strengths of
opponents and rewards their intransigence, believing thereby
that it can solve international problems. In Taiwan's case, it
defers to the PRC, hoping without any apparent justification
that acceding to Beijing's demands on U.N. representation for
the ROC will help the United States on some other matter.
In the PLO's case, the administration seemed simply worn
down by the PLO's insistence on enhancing its status, and
mounted only a cursory and obviously ineffective diplomatic
opposition. This too has not escaped notice internationally.
An even larger lesson is that the disparity of treatment of
the PLO and Taiwan ultimately reflects a presidential
unwillingness to engage on really difficult international
issues.
When he does engage, he tends to put pressure on America's
friends to accommodate their adversaries, a curious inversion
at best. Successes which fall into his lap, or which have
tangible domestic political benefit get his attention, but not
much else. That remains the unfortunate prospect for the rest
of his presidency, a two-year-long period of jeopardy for
America.